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ly, and the place whence they come, and where they are, and the time at which they appear to me, and when, without any interruption, I can unite the feeling which I have of them with the course of the rest of my life, I am fully assured that I perceive them while awake and not in my sleep. And I ought not in any way to doubt the truth of these things, if, after having invoked all my senses, my memory, and my understanding, for their examination, there is nothing communicated to me by any of them repugnant to what is communicated to me by the others. For from this fact that God is no deceiver, it necessarily follows that I am not in that deceived. But, because the necessity of affairs often obliges us to decide for ourselves before we have had leisure to examine them so carefully, it must be admitted that the life of man is subject to very frequent deception in particular things, and finally we must recognize the infirmity and the weakness of our nature.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF PLATO.

Translated from the German of G. W. F. HEGEL.

II.—DIALECTIC.

We have already remarked that the province of the true dialectic is to show up the necessary movement of the pure concepts [or categories of pure thought]—not as a movement wherein they are reduced to naught—but the result should be that the pure thought concepts prove to be this movement and that the Universal is seen to be the unity of such anti-thetic concepts. It is true that we do not find in Plato a clear consciousness of this nature of the dialectic, but still we find in his writings the true dialectic itself: we find the Absolute essence recognized in the form of pure ideas, and we find also the exposition of the movement of these ideas. That which makes the study of the Platonic dialectic difficult is this development and the demonstration of the Universal from the notions of common consciousness. This beginning [with ordinary notions] which it would seem ought to facilitate the arrival at science, proves rather to make the difficulty greater,

since it leads into a field in which something prevails that is quite different from what possesses validity in Reason, and it brings us face to face with sensuous objects; while in the sphere of Reason, on the contrary, one enters the movement of pure ideas alone, and he is not reminded at all of the former [sensuous] sphere. But through this very contrast the ideas gain greater truth. For the pure logical movement is quite apt to be conceived as existing for itself, like a separate province which has another province [sensuous consciousness] lying beside it which possesses equal validity. But when the two are brought together as in Plato, the Speculative manifests itself first in its truth: it appears, namely, as the *only* truth, and this is demonstrated through the [dialectic] change of the sensuous state of *opinion* into thought. In our common consciousness, for example, there is in the first place the immediate individual, the sensuous reality; moreover, these are determinations of the understanding, and they pass with us as ultimate truths. In opposition to external reality, however, the Ideal is to be considered rather as the most real of all; and that it is the only Real, is the insight of Plato, who defines the Universal or Thought to be the True, and the Sensuous to be the converse of this.

The purpose of many of Plato's dialogues, which end without any affirmative content, is therefore to show: that immediate existence, including the many things which appear to us, even granting that we have quite correct notions about them, are yet not in themselves true in an objective sense, for the reason that they change, and are determined [or made to be what they are] through their relation to other things and not through themselves; hence one must even in sensuous individuals pay attention to the Universal alone; and this is called by Plato "the Idea." The sensuous, limited, finite, is in fact not only itself but likewise another, which also possesses existence; and hence it is an unsolved contradiction, since in it its other holds sway. [In a thing of space, dependence upon other things is its characteristic; and thus its real self is a totality transcending it.] It has already been mentioned that the Platonic dialectic is employed for the purpose of confusing and annulling the finite notions of men in order to bring them to realize their want of scientific knowledge, and to direct

them to the search for that which *is*. Through the fact that the Dialectic is directed against the form of the Finite, its first effect is to confound the Particular; and this is accomplished through the activity by which the negation contained in it is shown up; so that it proves to be not what it seemed to be, but passes over into its opposite through its limit which is essential to it. If, however, this latter is held fast, in its turn it too ceases, and is found to be another than that for which it was assumed. From the point of view of formal philosophizing the dialectic may seem to be nothing else but an art whose function is to throw into confusion not only the notions of common consciousness but also the pure ideas of Reason, and thereby exhibit their nothingness; in this, its result is held to be a merely negative one. With this phase of it in view, Plato also, in his Republic (Book VII.), advises that citizens be initiated into the dialectic only on completing their thirtieth year, alleging as the reason that through its means one is able to change the beautiful doctrines which he has heard from his teachers into ugly ones. This form of the dialectic we see chiefly in those dialogues of Plato that are peculiarly Socratic—moral dialogues,—and also in those numerous dialogues that refer to views of the Sophists upon Science.

With this is connected also the second side of the dialectic, which aims before all to bring to consciousness the Universal; and this, as already remarked [in speaking of Socrates], was one of the chief ends of the Socratic teaching. This we may look upon henceforth as settled, and only remark that, besides these, several other dialogues of Plato have the aim only to bring to consciousness a general view which *we* possess without special effort on our part; on this account the prolixity of Plato often proves tedious to us. Although this dialectic is an activity of thought, yet it is essentially only an external form of it, and necessary for the reflecting stage of consciousness in order that it may arrive at the knowledge of the Universal which is in-and-for-itself, unchangeable, and immortal. These two preliminary sides of the dialectic whose purpose is to cancel the particular and thus to produce the universal, are not the true form of the dialectic; it constitutes a form of the dialectic which Plato used in common with

the Sophists, who understood very well how to annul what was merely particular in its nature. A content which Plato often treated with this purpose in view is that in which he shows virtue to be but one; and by this process he derives the universal good from the particular virtues.

Inasmuch as the Universal (i. e. the True, the Beautiful, and the Good—that which is genus for itself) derived through the confusion [negating] of the Particular, was at first yet undetermined and abstract, it is, *thirdly*, the chief aim in the labors of Plato to define the Universal in itself more definitely. This defining (determining) is the relation which the dialectical movement in thought has to the Universal; for through this movement the idea arrives at such thoughts as contain in themselves the antitheses involved in what is finite. The idea is then, as the self-determining, the unity of these antithetically opposed sides; and hence is the *determined* idea. The universal is therefore the determined Universal which solves and has solved the contradictions in it, and consequently that which is in itself concrete; so that the cancelling of the contradiction is affirmation. The dialectic in this higher function is the Platonic dialectic proper: as speculative, it does not end with a negative result, but it presents the union of antithetic sides which have annulled each other. At this point the difficulty for the Understanding begins. Since the form of the method as used by Plato is not as yet purely developed for itself, his dialectic is frequently mere ratiocination, proceeding from individual points of view, and often ending without results. On the other hand, Plato himself has condemned this merely ratiocinative dialectic; it is, however, easy to see that it troubles him to draw the proper distinction between it and the true dialectic. This speculative dialectic which begins with him is hence the most interesting feature of his works, but at the same time the most difficult to understand; and for this reason it is not often learned when one studies Platonic writings. Thus Tennemann, for example, has allowed the most important things in the Platonic Philosophy to escape him entirely, and has brought together only a few thoughts from it in the shape of dry ontological determinations; namely, such as served his turn. It is, however, an indication of the highest degree of defi-

ciency in the proper spirit on the part of an historian of Philosophy to find in a great philosopher only what goes to serve his particular ends.

What Plato seeks in the dialectic is the pure thought of the Reason, from which he very carefully discriminates the Understanding (*dianoia*). One can have thoughts concerning many things, if he has thought at all; but Plato does not mean this sort of thoughts. The true speculative greatness of Plato, that through which he makes an epoch in the history of Philosophy, and consequently in the world-history in general, is the more definite comprehension of the Idea: an insight which some centuries later constitutes the fundamental element in the ferment of the world-history and in the new organic form of the human spirit. This closer comprehension can be understood from what has preceded: Plato in the first place apprehended the absolute as the "Being" of Parmenides, but as the universal which, as *genus* is, *final cause* (i. e. rules the special, the manifold—penetrates and produces it): but Plato did not fully develop this thought of a self-producing activity; hence he falls at times into external teleology. As the union of principles held by philosophers before him, Plato moreover proceeded from this "Being" to determinateness and distinction (as it is contained in the trinity of the Pythagorean determinations of numbers), and expressed these distinctions in the form of thought; in short, he apprehended the Absolute as unity of being and not-being (as Heraclitus says), in the becoming—the unity of the one and many, &c. Furthermore, he took up the Eleatic dialectic, which is the mere external act of the subject—the mere showing up of a contradiction—and elevated this into the objective dialectic of Heraclitus in such a way, that, in place of the external changeability of things, there appears their internal transition, i. e. of their ideas, or, in other words, of their categories, from and through themselves. Finally, while Socrates used the thinking activity only for the purpose of the moral reflection of the subject, Plato has established it as objective, as the IDEA, which is not only the universal thought, but also that which is true existence. Hence the earlier Philosophies do not perish for the reason that Plato has refuted them, but they vanish only in something higher—in his philosophy.

Such pure thoughts—in the consideration of which the Platonic Philosophy busies itself wholly—are, besides being and not being, *the one* and *the many* and such others as, e. g., the *Finite* and the *Infinite*. The purely logical, quite abstruse treatment of such objects contrasts very strongly with the activity of imagination exercised upon the beautiful, charming, humorous content of Plato's writings. The consideration of these pure thoughts is to him the highest function of Philosophy, and that which he everywhere expresses as the true philosophical and scientific cognition of truth; in this he places the distinction between Philosophers and Sophists. The Sophists, in contrast to the former, treat only of the phenomenal, which they hold fast in opinion: hence although they have thoughts too, yet these are not *pure* thoughts, or thoughts of that which is in-and-for-itself. This is a side which causes many to go away from Plato unsatisfied by the study of his works. When one begins a dialogue he finds, in this free form of Platonic exposition, beautiful natural scenery, a magnificent introduction which promises to lead us through flowery fields into Philosophy, and that too into the highest Philosophy, the Platonic. One encounters in it that exalting element which especially appeals to youth; but it all disappears soon. If one has allowed himself to be allured by those pleasant scenes at first, he must now renounce them; and coming to the really dialectical and speculative portions, he must enter on toilsome paths, and allow himself to be pricked by the thorns and thistles of metaphysics. For look, there follow next, as the highest, the investigations concerning the ONE and MANY, BEING and NOUGHT; this was not to be expected, and the reader lays down the book silently, wondering how Plato could seek in such places for knowledge. From the deepest dialectical investigations Plato then passes over again to pictures and images for the fancy, to the painting of scenes of conversation between men of genius: thus it happens, e. g., in the *Phædon*, which Mendelssohn has modernized and changed into Wolfian metaphysic; the beginning and end are exalting, beautiful; the middle portion contains the dialectic. Thus Plato's dialogues require very different tones of mind in reading them. Hence their study demands in some sort an *indifference* toward the vari-

ous interests. If one reads with interest the speculative, he skips what is considered the most beautiful; if one has interest in the exalting, edifying portion, he skips the speculative and finds it uninteresting. It goes with him as with the youth in the Bible, who had done this and that, and now asked Christ what course he should still take to follow him. But when the Lord commanded him, "Sell your goods and give to the poor, then the youth went away sorrowing"; it was more than he expected. So—in our day—many, who meant well with Philosophy, have studied Fries and I know not what other philosopher. Their bosoms swell with aspiration for the True, the Good, and the Beautiful; they fain would know and see what ought to be done; but in their bosoms there is only the good-will to do—there is no *actual endeavor* corresponding to that good-will.

While Socrates holds fast to the good, universal, in-itself-concrete thought, without fully developing it, and hence without exhibiting it systematically, Plato proceeds to the fully determined IDEA [the definite exposition of it]; but *his* incompleteness lies in the fact that this determinateness and that universality are not united. Through the reduction of the dialectic movement to its final result, the determined [well-defined] idea can be obtained, and that is the chief object of Science. When Plato, however, speaks of Justice, the Beautiful, the Good, the True, nothing is shown as to their origin; they appear, therefore, not as results, but as direct assumptions—as mere presuppositions. Although consciousness has the unwavering conviction that they are the highest objects, yet what is asserted of them is nowhere proved. This dialectic of pure thoughts (since the dogmatic expositions of Plato on ideas are lost), is given to us only in the dialogues on this subject, which precisely because they deal with pure thoughts are among the most difficult ones: these are the Sophist, the Philebus, and, more especially, the Parmenides. Those dialogues which contain only negative dialectic and Socratic conversation we here omit, since they treat only of concrete notions and do not contain the dialectic in that higher sense; they do not satisfy our demands, for the reason that their ultimate purpose is only to confound the opinions of the individual, or else to awaken in him a desire for knowledge. But

the three dialogues mentioned express the abstract speculative idea in its pure comprehension. The bringing together of the antithetic positions into one and the expression of this unity is lacking in *Parmenides*; and this dialogue therefore, like those others mentioned, has in some respects a merely negative result. In the *Sophist*, however, and also in the *Philebus*, Plato expresses this unity.

The Parmenides.

a. The elaborated dialectic, the proper dialectic, is contained in the *Parmenides*—that most famous masterpiece of the Platonic dialectic. *Parmenides* and *Zeno* are there represented as meeting *Socrates* in *Athens*; but the chief matter is the dialectic placed in the mouths of *Parmenides* and *Zeno*. At the beginning, the nature of this dialectic is brought out in detail in the following manner. Plato makes *Parmenides* praise *Socrates* thus: "I noticed that you, with *Aristotle*"—(one of the persons present at the dialogue; he has been taken for the philosopher, but the latter was born sixteen years after *Socrates*' death)—"that you, conversing with *Aristotle*, exercised yourself in determining in what the nature of the Beautiful, the Just, the Good, and each of these ideas, lay. This ardor of yours is beautiful and divine. But practise yourself still more in this apparently useless exercise, which is called by the multitude 'mere idle talk,' while you are yet young; otherwise the truth will escape you."—"In what," asks *Socrates*, "consists this kind of exercise?"—"You pleased me in that you said just now that one must not hold fast to the consideration of the sensuous and its illusions, but consider that which is only to be seized by thought, and which alone IS." I have already remarked [see *Hegel's Works*, Vol. VI., Part I., p. 8] that men have in all times believed that the True could be found only through reflection; for in reflection one finds thoughts, and through reflection he changes that which he has before him in the form of representation, or what he receives upon faith, into thoughts. *Socrates* replies in the present instance to *Parmenides*: "In this way I believed the *like* and *unlike*, and the other universal determinations of things, would be best understood." *Parmenides* answers: "Well! But you must, when you begin with such a deter-

mination, not only consider that which follows from assuming it, you must also add this which follows when you assume the *opposite* of such a determination. For example, in the assumption—*the many is*—you have to examine: what happens to the *many* in relation to *itself* and in relation to the *one*; and likewise, what happens to the *one* in relation to *itself* and in relation to the *many*.” This is precisely the wonderful thing which one encounters in thinking, when he takes such determinations for and by themselves; they each go over into its opposite. But again it is to be considered, if the many is not, what happens then to the *one* and to the *many*, both for themselves and for each other? Precisely such considerations are to be instituted in relation to *identity* and *non-identity*, *rest* and *movement*, *beginning* and *ceasing*, and likewise in respect to *being* itself and *non-being*; what is each for itself, and what is their relation when one or the other is assumed. In this, by exercising yourself perfectly, you will learn to know the essential truth.” Such great stress as this Plato lays upon the dialectical consideration—which is no consideration of what is merely external, but a vital consideration, whose content consists in pure thoughts only; and their movement is precisely this, that they make themselves the other of themselves; and hence show that only their unity is the truly justified result.

Concerning the meaning of the unity of one and many, Plato makes Socrates say: “When one proves to me that I am one and many, I am not surprised. Since namely he shows to me that I am a *manifold* by exhibiting to me my right and left sides, my upper and lower extremities, my anterior and posterior: and again he proves me to be *one* by pointing out that I am one of us seven. Just in this manner stone, wood, &c., can be shown to be one and many. But I should be surprised if one defined the ideas, such as *likeness* and *unlikeness*, *multiplicity* and *unity*, *rest* and *movement*, and the like, in the first place each as determined for itself, and then showed how they were *identical* and *different* in themselves.” The dialectic of Plato, however, is not to be acknowledged as perfect in every respect. If it is his special object to show merely that in each determination its opposite is contained, even then one cannot say that in all his dialectic

movements this strict form is preserved; but there often occur external considerations which have influence in his dialectic. For example, Parmenides says: "Will the two parts of the *existent one*—the *one* and the *existent*—ever cease, the *one* to be a part of the *existent*, and the *existent*, to be a part of the *one*? Hence, each part contains again the *one* and the *existent*, and the smallest part consists always of these two parts." In other words: the *one* IS; from this it follows that the *one* is not synonymous with *is*, and hence *one* and *is* are distinct. Thus there is in the proposition: *the one is*, a distinction; hence the *many* is in it, and hence I assert the *many* when I say *the one is*." This dialectic is correct but not quite pure, since it *begins* with a combination of two determinations [i. e. presupposes them]. The entire result of such investigation in the Parmenides is thus summed up at the end: "that the *one*, whether it is or is not, is the *many as well as itself*, and in relation to *another* as well as *for-itself*—all throughout is *not*, as well as *is*; it *appears* and *does not appear*." This result may appear strange. We are, according to our ordinary views, very far removed from taking these quite abstract determinations—the *one*, *being*, *not-being*, *appearance*, *rest*, *movement*, and the like—for ideas; but these entirely universal somewhat Plato takes as ideas, and this dialogue is therefore his science of pure ideas. He shows of the One that it, if it is, just as well as if it is not, as self-identical or not self-identical, whether in movement or at rest, beginning or ceasing, *is and is not*; or, in other words, that the unity as well as all these pure ideas in their multiplicity are and are not; hence that the one is the many as well as the one. In the proposition, "*The one is*," there is also involved, "The one is not one, but many"; and conversely, "The many is" involves "The many is not many, but one." These abstractions are shown in the dialectic to be essentially the identity with their others; and this is what is true. An example of this is found in the Becoming: in the Becoming, Being and not-being are contained in inseparable unity, and yet they are in this also distinct; for Becoming consists only in the *passage* of one into the other.

Perhaps this result in Parmenides may not satisfy us, for it has the appearance of having a negative character instead

of being the *negation of negation*, which expresses the true affirmation. In this latter sense the New Platonists take it especially Proclus, hence they look upon this exposition in the Parmenides as the true Theology, as the true revelation of all the mysteries of the divine Essence. And they may well be taken for this, however improbable this may at first appear (indeed Tiedemann, *Platon. Argumenta*, p. 350, pronounces such assertions to be mere Neoplatonic extravagance). In fact, however we apply the name *God* to the Absolute essence of all things, which is in its simple comprehension the unity and movement of these pure essentialities, the ideas of the *one* and *many*, &c. The divine essence is the idea in general, as it is either for the sensuous consciousness or for thought. In so far as the divine idea is the absolute Self-thinking activity, the dialectic is nothing else than this activity of the self-thinking in itself; this connection the New Platonists look upon only as *metaphysical*, and they have excogitated from it Theology—the development of the mysteries of the divine essence. But here enters the already mentioned ambiguity, which must now be explained more definitely: under the terms “God” and “The essence of things” two different contents may be understood. When namely it is asserted, on the one hand, that the essence of things is the unity of opposites, it seems as though only the immediate essence of these immediately objective things is defined by this, and such a doctrine of Essence—or such Ontology—may seem to be different from the knowledge of God, or Theology. These simple essences and their relation and movement seem to express only moments of the Objective, and not Spirit itself, for the reason that they still lack one moment (namely, that of *reflection into itself*) which we demand for the being of the divine essence. For spirit, the true Absolute Essence, is not only the simple and immediate in general, but it is that which is reflected into itself [i. e. self-conscious], for which there exists, even in its self-opposition, the unity of itself and its opposite; as such however those moments and their movement do not exhibit it, but they appear as simple abstractions. Upon the other hand, they may also be taken as pure ideas belonging to the pure reflection-into-itself. Thus there is wanting to them Being, which we demand for the

reflection-into-itself of the divine essence; and, besides, their movement passes for an empty play with empty abstractions which belong only to Reflection, but have no reality. To solve this antithesis [antinomy] we must learn to know the nature of scientific cognition and knowledge so as to have in the form of idea all which is therein. In this way we shall become conscious that the idea in truth is neither the mere immediate (though it is simple), nor is it merely that which reflects itself into itself, the "thing" of consciousness; but it possesses *spiritual* simplicity, hence is essentially the thought which has returned into itself, and is moreover in itself, i. e. objective essence, and consequently all reality. This consciousness concerning the nature of the comprehension, Plato has not expressed so definitely, and hence also has not said that this essence of things is the same as the divine essence. It is, however, only an omission on his part to say so in direct words, for the thing itself is certainly there; and there is here only such a difference of expression as there is between the form of representation and that of comprehension. In one respect, therefore, this reflection-into-itself, the spiritual, the idea, is present in the speculations of Plato; for the unity of the one and the many, &c., is just this individuality in the difference, this being-turned-into-itself in its opposite, this opposite which is in itself; the essence of the world is essentially the into-itself-returning movement of that which has returned into-itself. In another respect, however, Plato still holds fast to this reflection-into-itself as separate from it—that is, as God according to the form of ordinary consciousness; and in his exposition of the becoming of Nature in the *Timæus*, they appear thus as distinct from each other: God, AND the essence of things.

The Sophist.

b. In the *Sophist*, Plato investigates the pure concepts or ideas of *movement* and *rest*, *self-identity* and *other-being*, *being* and *not-being*. He proves here against Parmenides that the not-being *is*, likewise that the simple and self-identical participates in other-being, unity in multiplicity. Of the Sophists, he says that they hold fast to the not-being; and he refutes their entire standpoint, which is that of the *not-*

being, sensation, or the many. Plato has, therefore, defined the true Universal as the unity of such ideas as the *one* and *many*, or of *being* and *non-being*; but at the same time he has avoided—or it lay in his intention to avoid—the ambiguity which lies therein when we speak of the “unity of Being and naught,” &c. With this expression namely we lay the chief accent on the unity, and then the difference vanishes, as if we only abstracted from it. Plato has sought to preserve also the distinction. The Sophist is a more complete treatment of being and non-being, both of which belong to all things; for since things are different—each the other of the other—in them there lies the determination of the negative. First of all, however, Plato expresses in the Sophist this more definite insight concerning ideas as abstract universalities: that they are not to be held as fixed and unchangeable, for this would be to oppose the unity of the idea with itself. Plato therefore refutes, first, the sensuous, and, secondly, the [isolated validity of the] ideas themselves. The first of these views [the sensuous] is the later so-called Materialism: that matter alone is the substantial, and that nothing has reality except what can be felt by the hands, like rocks and oak trees. “Now,” says Plato, secondly [in the Sophist], “we will go to the others, the friends of ideas.” Their notion is that the substantial is incorporeal, intelligible; and they separate the field of the Becoming, of Change, in which the sensuous falls, from the Universal, which is for-itself. They represent ideas as immovable somewhats to which belongs neither activity nor passivity. Plato brings against this doctrine the argument that one cannot deny motion, life, soul, and thought, to the truly existent, and that the Divine Reason could exist nowhere, nor in anyone, if it were unmoved. Plato has thus a clear consciousness that he has gone beyond Parmenides when the latter says:

“Never shalt thou explore for the whereabouts of non-being,
But from a search like this, turn away the soul speculative.”

Plato says, therefore: the existent participates in the not-being as well as in the Being; the participating is, however, different from Being and not-being as such.

This dialectic is directed chiefly against two other kinds of dialectic.

First, against the dialectic in the ordinary acceptation of that term, of which we have also spoken. Examples of this false dialectic, to which Plato recurs frequently, are found especially in the Sophists; and yet he has not treated with sufficient clearness their difference from the pure dialectic cognition, according to the idea. Plato explains himself [in the Sophist], for example, in this style, in reply to the assertion of Protagoras and others, "that there is no determination in-and-for-itself": bitter is not an objective existence, since what tastes *bitter* to one person is for another person *sweet*; likewise great and small, more and less, &c., are relative determinations, since the great, in one case, is, under other circumstances, small; the small, in the same way, is great. In other words, the unity of opposites hovers before every consciousness; but the common mode of view, which does not arrive at a consciousness of what appertains to REASON, always holds asunder the opposites, as if they were only opposed in a particular respect. Just as we show in each thing the unity as well as the multiplicity, since it has many parts and properties. In the Parmenides, also, we saw that Plato criticised this form of the unity of opposites, because in it something is held to be *one* in quite a different respect from that in which it is held to be *many*. In such a unity we do not bring these thoughts [i. e. the different sides of the antithesis] together, but the imagination (or *argument*) passes to and fro from one to the other. If this passing backwards and forwards is consciously employed, it is the empty dialectic which does not unite the opposites truly. Plato says on this subject: "If anyone takes pleasure in this as though he had found something difficult—because he is able to move his thought from one determination to another—he has no occasion for self-congratulation; for that is a feat that is neither difficult nor excellent." That dialectic which cancels a determination by showing up its defect [i. e. its dependence on other-being], and then goes about establishing another, is incorrect. "The difficult and true way is this, to show that the somewhat and its other are the same [whole], and that the identity of the somewhat involves an other: and indeed in the same respect, and according to the same point of view that the one determination is found in them, the other determina-

tion also is to be shown in them. On the contrary, to show that the same being is in *some form or other* an other, and the converse of this—for instance, that the great is *also* the small” (e. g. Protegoras’s dice), “and the similar is *also* dissimilar—to relish such a procedure as this, which always produces the opposites from their grounds,—this belongs to no true insight, but is evidently the production of a novice” in thought “who begins to deal with Entity for the first time. To separate all things, each from the other, is the awkward method of the consciousness uncultured in philosophic procedure. It is a perfect abandoning of all thought to let everything rest in complete isolation; for thought consists precisely in the uniting of ideas.” Thus Plato speaks directly against this species of dialectic which knows only how to refute something according to some particular point of view, &c. We see that Plato, in regard to the content, expresses nothing else than what has been termed “the indifference in the difference”: the difference of absolute opposites and their unity. In contrast to this speculative cognition he portrays the common thought, positive as well as negative: the former [the positive common thinking], not bringing together these thoughts, allows first one and then another to pass as valid separately; the latter [the negative species of common thinking], although conscious of the unity of these opposites, knows only a superficial unity—a divisible unity, or a unity in which the two moments are in reality still held asunder, being united only in some one respect and separate in others.

The second species of dialectic against which Plato directs his own dialectic, is that of the Eleatics and their proposition, which in its kind is also similar to that of the Sophists, namely: that Being only is, and not-being is not at all. This means with the Sophists (as Plato shows): “Since the negative does not exist at all, but only Being exists, it follows that there is nothing untrue or false in the world; all that *exists*, all that is for us, is for that reason [i. e. because it exists] necessarily true, and what does not exist we cannot know or perceive. Plato, therefore, reproaches the Sophists with having cancelled the distinction of the true and false. Arrived upon this stage of the dialectic consciousness (and the whole matter is only a distinction of different stages), “the Sophists could

not give what they promised: this was, namely, to show that whatever the individual believed to be his interest, and made it his object to attain, was affirmative and correct [i. e. individual opinion made the true and right: "Man is the measure of all things"]. According to this view, one could not say of a deed: This is wrong, wicked, or a crime; for this would imply that the principle on which it is done is a false one. No more could one say: This opinion is illusive; for, according to the doctrine of the Sophists, whatever I feel, or whatever opinion I may have, in so far as it is my own, is an affirmative content, and consequently is true and correct. The proposition looks quite abstract and innocent in itself; but one notices first what such abstractions contain when he sees them in their concrete shape. According to this innocent proposition, it follows logically that there is no such thing as sin, or crime, &c. The Platonic dialectic is essentially different from this kind of dialectic.

The more special meaning of Plato is that the IDEA—the in-and-for-itself Universal, Good, True, or Beautiful—is to be taken as existing for itself, and not simply as a subjective affair. The myth [of the Cave] which I have already mentioned goes so far as to set up the doctrine that one must not consider a good deed, a beautiful man—not the *subject* of which such determinations are the predicates: but that that which appears in such representations or intuitions as *predicates* must be taken for-and-by-itself, and that this is the true essence. This is connected with the form of the dialectic which has been discussed. An action taken according to the empirical representation may be said to be just; according to another side, one could point out also opposite characteristics. But the Good, the True, is to be taken without such individualities, without such empirical concrete material, but as for-itself-existent; and this is alone what IS. The soul, in the divine drama, having lapsed into matter, yet rejoices over a beautiful or just object; but the only true Being is Virtue, Justice, Beauty in-and-for-itself. It is, therefore, the Universal for-itself which is more definitely determined through the Platonic dialectic; of this dialectic there occur several forms, but these forms are still very general and abstract. The highest form with Plato is the identity of Being and Non-

being; the true is the existent, but this existent is not without negation. Plato undertakes in this to show that non-being is an essential determination of the existent, and that the simple, self-identical, participates in Other-being. This unity of being and non-being is also found in the doctrine of the Sophists; but in the shape taught by them it is not as yet completely expressed. But the further examination which Plato gives it comes to this result, that non-being, more accurately defined, is the nature of the OTHER: "The ideas mingle, and being and *the other* run through all and through each other; *the other* for the reason that it participates in being, through this indwelling of being will BE, but [will be] not the same as that which dwells in it, but a different: and as the other of Being, it is necessarily the Non-being. Since, however, Being likewise participates in other-being, it is therefore different from the other ideas and is not one of the same; so that it, in ten thousand different ways, IS NOT; and so also the others, as well individually as generally, ARE in a manifold form, and ARE NOT in manifold ways." Plato in this expresses that the OTHER as the negative, non-identical in general is at the same time, in one and the same respect, the with-itself identical; i. e. these are not different sides which remain in contradiction to each other.

This is the chief conclusion of Plato's own dialectic. That the Idea of the Divine, the Eternal, the Beautiful, is that which exists *in-and-for-itself*, [the knowledge of this] is the first step in the elevation of consciousness into Spiritual insight, namely, into the conviction that the Universal is true [i. e. that Truth *is* the Universal]. As for the imagination, it is well enough to arouse it and animate it with representations of the Beautiful and the Good; but the thinking cognition asks after a definite statement regarding the nature of this Eternal and Divine. And the Nature of this Eternal and Divine is, essentially, free determination alone, and the being *determined* does not in any way interfere with its universality;—a limitation (for every determination is limitation) which nevertheless leaves the Universal in its infinitude free by itself. Freedom exists only in the Return-into-itself, the undistinguished [pure identity] is lifeless; the active, living, concrete Universal is, therefore, that which distinguishes

itself within itself [i. e. defines, limits itself], but remains free in this process. This determinateness consists only in this: that the ONE is self-identical in its other, in the Many, the Different. This constitutes the only true point of interest for science in what is called Platonic Philosophy; and if one does not know this, he is ignorant of the most important thing. In the already quoted passage, in which Socrates shows himself to be one and many, the two thoughts fall asunder [i. e. One and Many are taken as "different respects"]: yet the speculative thought is reached only through bringing together these thoughts; and this bringing together of different ones—of Being and Not-being, of the One and Many, &c.—without explaining them by a mere transition from the one to the other, is the innermost and the true greatness of the Platonic Philosophy. This feature is the "Esoteric" of the Platonic Philosophy, all else is exoteric. (This, indeed, is a wretched distinction, when it is taken as though Plato had two philosophies—one for the world, for the people; the other the internal, reserved for his disciples. The Esoteric I speak of is, however, the Speculative, which, though written and printed, without any secrecy, remains a sealed book for those who have not interest enough to exert themselves in its study.) To this Esoteric belong the two dialogues already considered, and to them the *Philebus* is to be added as the third.

The Philebus.

c. In the *Philebus*, Plato investigates the nature of pleasure; and in that dialogue is treated especially the antithetic of the finite and infinite, or, of the unlimited and the limited.

If we bring this before our minds, we do not at first see how the nature of Pleasure is to be decided by the metaphysical knowledge of the nature of the infinite and undetermined; but these pure thoughts are the Substantial, through which all questions are to be decided, be they ever so concrete or ever so far off. When Plato treats of pleasure, and of wisdom as its opposite, it is the antithetic of finite and infinite. Under pleasure we represent what is immediate and individual—the sensuous; but it is the undetermined in that it is the merely elementary, just as fire or water is; it is

not the self-determining. Only the idea is the self-determining, the identity with itself. To our reflection the limited seems inferior in comparison with the unlimited, and the unlimited, on the contrary, seems to be something preferable, the highest; and the oldest philosophers looked upon this relation in the same way. By Plato, on the contrary, it is proved that the limiting is the true taken in the form of the *self-determining*, while the unlimited is the merely abstract; it [the abstract undetermined] may indeed be determined in a manifold way, but this determined result is in that case only the individual [or finite]. The infinite [in the sense of unlimited] is the formless; the free form as activity is the finite, which in the infinite finds the matter with which to realize itself. Sensuous pleasure Plato thus defines as the unlimited, which does not determine itself; only Reason is the active determiner. The infinite is, however, this potentiality to pass over to the finite: the perfected good is thus, according to Plato, to be sought neither in Pleasure nor in Reason, but it is in a life mingled of both. Wisdom, however, as the limit, should be the true cause whence proceeds what is of a preferable nature. As that which establishes the measure and limit, it is that which in-and-for-itself determines the final cause of its activity: the immanent determination with which and in which freedom at the same time gives itself existence.

Plato considers this—that the true is the identity of opposites—further: the infinite [or unlimited] is, as the undetermined, capable of more or less; it can have more or less intensity; it may be colder and warmer, dryer and moister, quicker and slower, &c. Now the limited is the equal, the double, and every other equilibrium through which the opposites cease to be related unequally, and become symmetrical and harmonious. Through the unity of those opposites, e. g. of the cold and warm, dry and moist, arises health: likewise the harmony in music arises through the mutual limitation of high and low tones, of quick and slow movements; in general, everything beautiful and perfect arises through the union of such opposites. Health, happiness, beauty, &c., appear thus as results produced by the combining of opposites: and thus as a mingling of them. (Instead of the expres-

sion "individuality," the ancients use chiefly the expressions "*mixing*" or "*mingling*," "*participation*," &c.; for us these are indefinite and unsatisfactory expressions.) But Plato says: the third, which is the resultant thus produced, presupposes a somewhat through which it is made, namely, a cause; and *this* [cause] is more excellent than those [contraries] through whose efficacy that third somewhat arises. Thus Plato has four determinations: *first*, the unlimited, the undetermined; *second*, the limited, measure, proportion, (to which wisdom belongs); the third is the mixture resulting from the two former—that which has only originated; the fourth is the Cause. The latter [the cause] is in it precisely the unity of the different ones: subjectivity, might and control over the opposites, that which has power to support in itself opposites; only the Spiritual, however, is so powerful that it can endure or sustain the antithesis, and the highest contradiction within itself: all weak, corporeal substance perishes as soon as it feels the approach of another. This Cause is found to be the divine Reason, the overseeing providence of the world; whatever is beautiful in the world, whether in air, fire or water, or, generally, in the realm of living beings, has originated through it. The absolute is hence that which is finite and infinite in one unity.

When Plato speaks thus of the Beautiful and Good, these are concrete ideas; or, rather, there is only one IDEA. But to such concrete ideas it is still a long road if one begins with such abstractions as *being*, *non-being*, *unity*, *multiplicity*. Although Plato has not accomplished the development and condensation of these abstract thoughts into [the concrete idea of] beauty, truth, and morality, yet in the science of those abstract determinations is found at least the criterion and the source of the Concrete. In the *Philebus* this transition to the concrete is made, inasmuch as the principle of sensation, or pleasure, is there considered. The ancient philosophers knew quite well what value these abstract thoughts possessed for the concrete. In the Atomistic principle of multiplicity we find thus the source of a construction of the state; for the ultimate thought of such "state-principles" is no less than a logical one. The ancients had in such pure philosophizing not the end and aim which we have: in general, the end

proposed lay before their minds not so much as a metaphysical consequence as a problem for solution. We, on the contrary, have before us a concrete formation, and wish to bring our pure thinking into agreement with this concrete material. In Plato, philosophy gives the direction which the individual should pursue in order to cognize this or that scientifically; but in general Plato sets up the doctrine that absolute happiness itself—the blessed life—consists in continual employment in the consideration of those divine objects [i. e. IDEAS].

This contemplative life seems to be without definite purpose for the reason that all interests have vanished in it. To live in the realm of free thought is, however, the highest, most essential object for the ancients; and they knew well that only in thought is freedom.

III.—NATURE PHILOSOPHY.

The Timæus.

With Plato, moreover, begins the endeavor on the part of Philosophy to extend its science to more concrete and special spheres; and thus the general material of knowledge [i. e. the objects of scientific study] began to specialize and to isolate itself more and more. In the *Timæus* the IDEA makes its appearance expressed in its concrete determinateness, and the Platonic Philosophy of Nature teaches us, therefore, to know more closely this essence of the world; but we cannot go into details as there is little interest in its elaboration. Especially where Plato goes into Physiology, what he says has no correspondence with our scientific data, though we must admire occasionally his excellent glances which have been only too much ignored by the moderns. Plato has adopted much from the Pythagoreans; how much belongs to them is not accurately determined. We have already remarked that the *Timæus* is really the revision [by Plato] of a work by a Pythagorean author: others however, hypercritical people, have said that the latter is only a selection which some Pythagorean made from a greater work of Plato; but the first is the likelier opinion. The *Timæus* has in all times passed for the most difficult and obscure of the Platonic Dialogues. The difficulty lies partly in the

external mingling of the comprehending cognition and imagination already remarked upon, an example of which we shall see in the passage where the Pythagorean numbers are introduced; secondly, however, the difficulty lies especially in the nature of the philosophical treatment of the subject itself, concerning which Plato had as yet no clear consciousness. This latter difficulty is the arrangement of the whole; namely, Plato in his exposition digresses frequently, and often seems to turn back and begin again at the beginning. This has moved critics, e.g. August Wolf and others, who did not know how to take it philosophically, to take the *Timæus* for an aggregate or a collection of fragments, or of several works, combined in an external manner, in which the Platonic element was united with much else. Wolf thought that he recognized in it its origin from oral conversations much in the same manner as his Homer. But, although the connection seems to be without method, Plato himself makes frequent excuses for its confused state; and we shall yet see on the whole how the subject necessitates a fragmentary treatment, and how a deeper internal ground renders necessary the repeated return to the beginning.

The exposition of the essence of nature, or of the becoming of the world, Plato introduces in the following manner: "God is the Good." (The Good stands also—in that oral discourse which Aristotle cites from — on the summit of the Platonic ideas); "the Good has, however, in nowise any envy in itself, and on this account it has made the world most similar to itself." *God* is here introduced without previous definition, and hence is a mere name quite empty as regards thought. When Plato begins again in the *Timæus*, he has a more definite notion of God. That God has no envy is, above all, a great, beautiful, true, though naive, thought. With the more ancient philosophers, on the other hand, Nemesis, Dike, destiny, envy, are the sole attributes of the gods; accordingly, they abase the great and make them insignificant, and cannot endure the presence of the worthy and sublime. The later nobler philosophers strive against such notions of Divinity. For in the mere conception of Nemesis there is contained no ethical determination, since the punishment consists only in an abasement of what exceeds due measure; but this measure

is not yet conceived as an ethical one, and punishment therefore is not yet a making valid of the ethical against the non-ethical. Plato's thought is likewise far higher than the view of very many moderns, who also ascribe envy to God when they assert that "God is a hidden God, who has not revealed himself, and of whom one can therefore know nothing." For why should He not reveal Himself to us if we earnestly apply ourselves to gain a knowledge of Him? A light loses nothing when another is lit by it; for this reason it was made a crime in Athens not to allow this to be done. If the knowledge of God is denied us so that we can know only the finite, and cannot attain to the infinite, then He is envious, or else *God* is a mere empty word. This assertion, that God is not revealed, means nothing else than this: that which is higher and divine we wish to leave alone by itself, and give our exclusive attention to our own petty interests, projects, &c. Such humility as this is an impiety and the sin against the Holy Ghost.

Plato continues: "God found the *visible*"—a mythical expression which arises from the necessity to begin with something immediate, which, however, one must not take literally just as it stands—"not in a quiescent state, but moved about fortuitously and in disorder; and he brought it from disorder to order since he regarded the latter as more excellent than the former." According to this passage, it looks as though Plato had assumed God to be only the *Demiurgus*, i. e. the disposer of matter, and matter to be eternal, independent, already existent, as Chaos; this is, however, according to what we have seen, not Plato's idea. These relations are philosophical dogmas of Plato with which he was in earnest; but from the fact that he has used the form of expression adapted to the style of the pure representation, such expressions as this passage contains have no philosophical value. It is only the introduction of the object for the purpose of showing up what determinations matter possesses. Plato then comes, in course, to further determinations, and these first constitute the concrete idea; to this latter speculative procedure we must hold fast, and not to the former representation. And so when he says, "God regarded order as more excellent," this is a naive mode of expression. With us one would

demand that the existence of God be first proved; just as little would one introduce the visible in this abrupt manner. What Plato shows in this naive manner is the first definition of the true character of the absolute IDEA which after him takes its place in Philosophy. He says further: "God, considering that of visible things those not endowed with reason could not be more beautiful than Reason itself, and that nothing could partake in Reason without soul, resolved to place Reason in the soul, and placed the soul in the body, and united them in such a manner that the world became an animated rational animal." We have here Reality and Reason opposed to each other, and the soul as the bond that connects these two extremes, without which Reason could not be participant in the visible body; in a style similar to this we saw in the *Phædrus* the true Real apprehended by Plato. "There is, however, only *one* such animal; for if there were two or more, these would be only parts of the one, and [hence still there would be] only one."

Now Plato proceeds at first to the idea of the corporeal entity: "For the reason that the world is to have bodily, visible and tangible existence, but cannot be seen without fire, nor touched without something solid, i. e. without earth, God made in the beginning fire and earth." In this childish way Plato introduces these extremes—the solid and the animated. "But two cannot be united without a third; there must be a bond between them that holds them together"—this is one of the pure expressions of Plato—"that bond, however, is the fairest which makes itself, and that which is united by it, in the highest degree, *one* [i. e. which is the unity of itself and the other]. This is a deep utterance in which is contained the concrete idea; the bond is subjectivity, individuality [i. e. consciousness], the power which prevails over the other and makes it identical with it. "This is realized most beautifully by a constant ratio; if, namely, of three numbers, masses, or powers, that which is the middle one is to the last as the first is to the middle; and conversely, as the last to the middle term so is that to the first" ($a : b :: b : c$). "When this middle term becomes the extremes and the extremes become in turn the means, it results from necessity that all are the same; and if they are all the same all are one." That is

excellent, and we retain it in philosophy even now ; it is the distinction which at the same time is none. This diremption from which Plato sets out is the syllogism well known in logic ; it appears in the form of the ordinary syllogism, in which therefore the entire rationality of the idea is contained at least externally. The differences are the extremes, and the middle term is the identity “which makes them, in the highest degree, one”: hence the syllogism is the Speculative, which in its conclusion unites the extremes with itself, since each place may be occupied by any one of the terms. It is, therefore, wrong to speak disparagingly of the syllogism and not to acknowledge it to be the highest and absolute form ; but the syllogism as a form of the Understanding, on the other hand, is justly open to contempt. This has no such middle term. Each of the terms passes in that syllogism for a different one in its own independent form, and as possessing its own peculiar determination in contradistinction to others. This is set aside in the Platonic Philosophy ; and the speculative constitutes the real true form of the syllogism whenever the extremes remain neither independent towards each other nor towards the middle term. In the syllogism of the Understanding, on the contrary, the unity which is produced, is only the unity of extremes that are held asunder and so remain ; for here one subject is joined by inference to *another* through the middle term, or “one concept is united to another.” In the syllogism of Reason, however, the chief point of its speculative grasp is the *identity* of the extremes which are joined by inference ; and this involves that the subject conceived in the middle term is some content or other which is joined not merely *to* another, but *through* and *in* the other, is self-identical. This is, in other words, the nature of God, which, when He is spoken of as subject, takes the form of this dogma, that He has begotten His son, the world ; but in this reality which manifests itself as another and at the same time remains identical with itself—which negates the lapse and unites itself in the other with itself—in this alone He is spirit. If one places the immediate above the mediated, and says God’s operation is immediate, his assertion has a good ground ; but the concrete [whole truth] is that God’s being is [or has the form of] a syllogism that unites itself to itself as a result through an act of

self-distinction, and is restored to immediateness through the annulment of mediation. The highest is thus contained in the Platonic Philosophy: they are only pure thoughts it is true, but they contain all; for all concrete forms depend solely on thought-determinations. The Church fathers have thus found in Plato the Trinity which they were seeking to seize in thought and to prove; in fact, the True as Plato defines it has the same determination as the Trinity. These forms, however, have remained unused for two thousand years after Plato, for they did not pass into the Christian Religion as [in the form of] thoughts; nay, it has been considered wrong to admit them in Theology at all, until in modern times men have begun to comprehend that the concrete idea is contained in these determinations, and therefore that Nature and Spirit can be cognized through them.

Plato continues: "Since the solid needs two middle terms, for the reason that it has not only depth but breadth also, God has placed between fire and earth, *air* and *water*; and according to such a proportion that fire is to *air* as *air* to *water*, and moreover *air* to *water* as *water* to *earth*." In the same way we have properly four elements of space; since the *point* is connected with the *solid* through the *line* and *surface*. This broken middle term which we find here is another important thought, having logical depth; and the number four which occurs here is in Nature a fundamental one. Being the Different [i. e. in two respects, being related to two extremes] which is turned towards both extremes, the middle term must contain a distinction in itself. In the syllogism in which God is the first, the Son the second (the mediating), and the Spirit the third, the middle is simple [there are *three* terms instead of *four*]. The cause, however, why that which is only *triune* in the rational syllogism, in Nature becomes a *fourfold* relation, lies in the constitution of Nature, since that which is immediately one in thought, in Nature falls asunder [into a dualism]. Therefore in Nature the antithetic exists as actual antithesis, and must be a Twofold; thus we have *four*, if we count. This takes place also in the conception of God; for when we apply it to the world we have as middle term Nature and existing Spirit as the form of Return from Nature, and the *returned* being is the Absolute Spirit [i. e. the *returned*

Being is the Being which has reached perfection, or exists in its absoluteness—and this is not *after* time as though it required time, and hence was a finite process. The return “was in the beginning with God, and it was God”]. This living process, this distinguishing, this positing as identical of the distinct ones, is the living God.

Plato says further: “Through this unity, the visible and tangible world has been made. Through the fact that God has given to it these elements whole and undivided, it is perfect, and does not grow old or suffer from disease. For old age and sickness arise only through the circumstance that such elements work upon a body in excess and from without. This, however, is here not the case; for the world contains those elements wholly within itself, and nothing can come to it from without. The shape of the world is globular” (the doctrine held by the Pythagoreans and Parmenides), “as the most perfect, which contains all others in itself; it is perfectly smooth, for there is nothing for it existing outside, and hence it needs no limbs.” Finitude consists in this, that a distinction [difference] from something else exists—an externality—for an object. In the IDEA there is also determination, limitation, distinction, other-being, but it is contained, at the same time, as dissolved or subordinated—held in the one; thus it is a distinction through which no finitude arises, but it [the distinction] is at the same time cancelled. Finitude is thus in the infinite itself; this is a great thought. “God has now given to the world the most appropriate of the seven movements, namely, that which is most befitting understanding and consciousness, the circular movement; the six others he has isolated from it and freed it from their irregularity” (forward and backward movements). This is said only in a general way.

It goes on thus: “Since God wished to make the world into a God, he therefore endowed it with *soul*, and placed it in the midst, and diffused it through the whole, and with it enveloped it from without; and in this way he brought into existence this self-sufficing entity, which needs no other one, but is to itself well-known and friendly. And thus has God by all these things begotten the world as a blessed God.” We may say: here where the world is [conceived as] a totality

through the World-soul, there is extant for the first time the knowledge of the IDEA; this "*begotten*" God, as the *middle term* and identity, is the true in-and-for-itself existing. That formerly mentioned God, who was only the Good, is on the contrary a mere presupposition, and therefore neither determined nor self-determining. "Now though we have spoken *last* concerning the soul, yet," says Plato, "it must not for this reason be thought to be the last itself, for this only pertains to our mode of speaking; it [the soul] is the ruling, the regal: the corporeal, on the other hand, is that which is obedient to it." This is the *naïveté* of Plato, to ascribe this inversion to the mode of speech; hence what in one place appears contingent is afterwards found to be necessary: namely, to begin with the immediate, and then to come by degrees to the concrete. We also must take this course, but with the consciousness that if we begin in Philosophy with such determinations as *being*, or God, Space, Time, &c., we speak of them also in an immediate manner, and this content itself, according to its nature, is at first immediate, but hence is at the same time undetermined. God, e.g. assumed at the beginning as an immediate [or well-known], is only truly proved at the end of the exposition, but still he is shown by the proof to be the *true* FIRST. One can thus, as has already been remarked, point out in such expositions Plato's confusion; but the only point at issue is, what he arrives at as the True.

More in detail, Plato shows us the nature of the absolute Idea in one of the most famous and profound passages, in which he recognizes in the essence of the soul really the same idea which he had already expressed as the essence of the corporeal. He says, namely: "The soul was created in the following manner. From the undivided essence which is eternally the same, and from the divided entity which is in bodies, God has formed a third species of existence by uniting the two, and the mixture partakes of the nature of the *self-identical* and of the nature of the *other*." (The divided means in Plato, the *other* as such or *in-itself* [i. e. other of itself], and not of any particular somewhat,) "and, according to this, God has made the soul the middle term between the undivided and divided." There come in again the abstract deter-

minations of the *one* which is the identity, and of the *many* or non-identical which is the antithetic, the distinction. If we were to say: "God, the absolute, is the identity of the identical and non-identical," many people would cry out, "Barbarism and scholasticism"; and yet these same people be all the while great admirers of Plato notwithstanding he has defined the True in the same way. "And taking these three entities as posited differently, God has united all in one IDEA, in that He has by force adjusted the nature of the *other* which is difficult to mix in with others to the self-identical." The force of the absolute IDEA is here alluded to, which posits the *many*—that which exists asunder—as *ideal*; and that is precisely also the force which has to be used against the understanding when anyone proposes anything of this sort to it.

Plato now describes how the self-identical as one moment, and the *other* or matter as the second moment, and the third moment which manifests itself as the cancelling of the first two and not as a union of moments which return into the first unity,—how these three that were distinct at first are now reduced to moments in the simple reflection into itself and the withdrawal of the former beginning: "Mingling the identical [1st] and the other [2d] with the essence" [3d] (i. e. with the third moment), "and, making *one* out of the three, God has again distributed this whole into parts—so many as seemed good to him." Since this substance of the soul is the same as that of the visible world, the result is that this one Whole now, for the first time, becomes the systematized substance, the true matter, the absolute stuff (material) which is sundered in itself, as an abiding and indivisible unity of one and many; and all further search for an essence must be abandoned. The mode and manner of division of this subjectivity contains the famous Platonic numbers, which without doubt belonged originally to the Pythagoreans; and they—ancients and moderns (even Kepler in his *Harmonia Mundi*)—have given themselves much trouble to explain these numbers, but as yet no one has really understood them. To understand them implies two things: In the first place, to recognize their speculative significance, their *concrete idea*. But, as already remarked in speaking of the Pythagoreans [in vol. I. of this History], these numerical distinctions express

in an indefinite way only, the forms of the concrete idea of *Distinction*, and even so much only in the first few numbers: when [in the higher numbers], however, the relations become more involved, they are entirely incapable of indicating them with any degree of precision. In the second place, numbers—since they relate to magnitudes—express only distinctions in sensuous things. The system of phenomenal magnitudes—and the sidereal system is that in which magnitudes manifest themselves in the purest and freest manner, without being subordinated to the qualitative—must therefore correspond to them [i.e. to numerical relations]. But these living numerical spheres are systems containing many subordinate moments: e.g. their distances, their velocity, and their masses. No individual of these moments can be compared with the system of sidereal spheres, or exhibited as a series of simple numbers; for the series corresponding to this can contain for its members only the system of these entire moments. Now if the Platonic numbers were also elements of each one of such systems, then any particular element could not be seized definitely and individualized in relation to the general series; but the relation of the moments which are distinguished in the movement, is that which is to be comprehended as *whole*, and this phase is the truly interesting and rational one. We have briefly to adduce the chief points historically; the most thoroughgoing treatise on this point is by Boeckh, “On the Formation of the World-soul in the *Timæus* of Plato,” in the third volume of *The Studies of Daub and Creutzer* (p. 26 *et seq.*)

The fundamental series is very simple: “First, God took a part from the whole; and then a second part double the size of the first; the third is one and a half times as much as the second, or thrice the size of the first; the next one (the fourth) is double the second; the fifth threefold the third; the sixth eightfold the first; the seventh [and last] is twenty-six times greater than the first.” The series is therefore: 1; 2; 3; 4=2²; 9=3²; 8=2³; 27=3³. “In the second place, God filled out the twofold and threefold intervals” (the relations 1 : 2 and 1 : 3) “by cutting off parts of the whole again. These parts he so arranged in the intervals that there are two middle terms in each, one of which is in the same ratio larger

than one and smaller than the other of the extremes, while the other [middle term] exceeds by a given sum one extreme and by the same sum is exceeded by the other extreme"—i. e. the first is a constant *geometrical* ratio, the other an *arithmetical* one. The first middle term [mean term] arises through the square and is hence, e. g., in the ratio 1 : 2, the proportion 1 : $\sqrt{2}$: 2; the other mean term is by the same [arithmetical] ratio the number $1\frac{1}{2}$. Through this arise in the next place new ratios, which again are interpolated into those first ones in a definitely given but more difficult form: so, however, that everywhere something is omitted and the last ratio of number to number is 256 : 243 or 2^8 : 3^5 .—These numerical ratios, however, do not help one much, for they present nothing for the speculative comprehension. The ratios and laws of Nature cannot be expressed by such barren numbers; they form only an empirical relation which does not constitute the fundamental basis of the proportions in Nature. Plato says further: "This whole series God divided lengthwise into two parts, and laid them upon one another crosswise like the letter X, and bent round their ends into a circle and closed them with a uniform movement; forming an inner circle and an outer one, the outer one as the revolution of the self-identical, the inner one as that of the *other-being* or of *self-distinction*, the former having the superiority as the undivided. Again, he has divided the internal, according to the mentioned ratios, into seven different circles, three of which revolve with equal velocity and four with unequal velocity as respects each other and the first three. This is the system of the soul, within which everything corporeal is shaped; it is the middle term, penetrates the whole, and envelopes it externally, and moves itself within itself; and has, therefore the divine basis for a ceaseless and rational life in itself." This is not entirely without confusion, and hence is to be taken only in a general sense, to wit: that since Plato finds the soul to be the all-including Simple in the idea of the corporeal universe, to him the essence of the corporeal and of the soul is that of the Unity in the Difference. This twofold Essence, posited *in-and-for-itself* in the Difference, systematizes itself within the One into many moments, which however are *movements*; so that this reality and the mentioned essence are—taken

together—this whole in the antithesis of soul and body, and the antithetic sides are again one. Spirit is the all-penetrating to which the corporeal is opposed, though the former (spirit) is in fact this extension itself [i. e. spirit is the ground of extension].

This is the general description of the soul which is placed in the world and rules it; and in so far as the substantial which is in matter resembles it, its identity is asserted [or confirmed] in itself. That the same moments are contained in it that constitute its reality means this: God, as absolute substance, sees nought but Himself alone. Plato describes, therefore, the relation of the soul to the Objective Essence, and makes it out that it (the soul), when it comes in contact with one of the moments of the same [i. e. the objective essence]—either the divisible [i. e. mutable] or indivisible substance—reflecting itself into itself [i. e. by its own spontaneity], and distinguishes both, it predicates of it what is identical in it and what is non-identical, and in what manner, place and time the individual relates to another and to the Universal. “Now if the circle of Sensuous things, running regularly on in its course, reveals its entire soul to scientific cognition” (if the different circles of the system of the world show themselves harmonious with the being-in-itself of spirit), “then arise true opinions and correct convictions. If, however, the soul applies itself to the Reasonable and the circle of the Self-identical yields to investigation, then thought becomes completed into science.” This is the essence of the world as the blessed God; in this is completed the absolute IDEA of the whole, and in accordance with this IDEA the world makes its appearance. Hitherto there had appeared only the *essence* of the sensuous, but not the *world* as sensuous; for though Plato had before spoken of fire, &c., yet in that place he gave only the essence of the sensuous; he would have done better, therefore, to omit those expressions. In this lies the reason why it appears as though Plato began anew to consider what he had already treated of. For the reason, namely, that one must begin with the abstract in order to know the true and concrete which makes its appearance only at a later stage, it follows that this (True and Concrete), when found, has the appearance and form of a new

beginning, and this happens especially in Plato's loose manner of exposition.

Plato now goes on to call this divine world also the model which exists alone in thought and is in eternal self-identity: This Totality, however, enters again into antithesis in such a manner that a *second* (the *copy* of that first one)—*the world* originates and becomes visible. This second one is the system of sidereal motion, but the former is the Life eternal. That which has origination and becoming in it, it is not possible to make perfectly like that first—the eternal IDEA. But it is made a self-moving image of the eternal which remains in the unity; and this eternal image which is moved according to number [numerical relations], is what we call time. Plato says of it: We usually call the *Was* and *Will be* parts of Time, and carry into the essence of Time these distinctions of the self-moving change in Time. The true time, however, is eternal, or the PRESENT. For substance is neither new nor old; and Time, as the immediate image of the Eternal is not divisible into Past and Future. Time is ideal like Space, and is not a [mere] sensuous existence, but rather the immediate form in which Spirit becomes objective—and thus is sensuous and not-sensuous. The real moments of the principle of the in-and-for-itself existent motion in time are those which undergo changes: "From the divine decree and will that created Time arose the Sun, the Moon, and the five other stars called Planets; they serve to fix and preserve the numerical relations of time." For these numbers of time are realized in them. Thus the celestial [sidereal] motion, as the true time, is the image of the eternal that abides in its unity, i. e. a realization on the part of the Eternal of its self-identity. For all exists in time; i. e. in a negative unity which allows nothing to take free root in itself and thus move or be moved by chance.

But this Eternal is also in the form of the other Essentiality—in the idea of the self-changing and erring principle whose Universal is MATTER. The eternal world has its copy in the world that belongs to time [i. e. pure time]; but standing in opposition to this is a second world that dwells essentially in the realm of change. The Self-identical and the Other are the abstract antithesis that we were lately considering. The

eternal world as posited in time has, therefore, two forms : the form of the Self-identical, and the form of the Self-changing and wandering. The three moments as they make their appearance in this last sphere are : *first*, the simple essence which is created—the produced or determined matter ; *second*, the Place in which it is created ; *third*, that which is the archetype of what is created. Or, as Plato gives them : “*Essence, Place, and Generation.*” Hence we have the syllogism in which Space is the middle term between individual production and the Universal. If we posit this principle in opposition to time, according to its negativity, then the middle term is this principle of *otherness* as general principle—“a receptive medium like a nurse”;—an entity that receives all, makes it self-subsistent and self-protecting. This principle is the Formless, which however is receptive of all forms, the general essence of all varieties of phenomena. Crude, passive matter is meant by such expressions ; that which is *relatively* substantial and subsisting only in general, but as external existence and mere abstract being-for-itself. In our style of reflection we distinguish it from its *form*, and, according to Plato, this is brought into being through the “nurse.” In this principle is found that which we call *Phenomenon* ; for matter is nothing but this persistence of the act of individual production in which diremption is posited. But that which is manifested in this is not to be posited as an individual, earthly existence, but is to be apprehended as universal in its determinateness. Since matter, inasmuch as it is the Universal, is the essence of every individual, Plato in the first place calls attention to the fact that one is not permitted to speak of these sensuous things : fire, water, earth, air, &c. (which here again make their appearance) ; for by this a fixed determinateness would be attributed to them—i. e. a permanent determinateness—but in fact that which abides is only their universality, these elements as universal : the fiery, the earthy, &c.

Plato makes a further exposition of the definite nature of these sensuous things or of their simple determinateness. In this world of change, spatial configuration is the universal form ; in that world which is the immediate image of the Eternal, time was the absolute principle. Here, on the other

hand, the absolute ideal principle is pure matter as such, and this is only another expression for the continuity of space. Space is the ideal essence of this phenomenal world, the middle term which unites positivity and negativity; but the determinatenesses of space are its configurations. Among the dimensions of space, the surface must be taken as the truly essential one for the reason that it forms the middle term between the line and the point, and in their first real limitation it is three-fold; so that the triangle is the first of [really limited] figures, while the circle, on the other hand, does not possess the limit as such. Here Plato comes to the treatment of configurations, all of which are formed from the triangle as the simple element; therefore the triangle is the essence of sensuous things. Hence he says, using a Pythagorean form of expression, that the connection and combination of this triangle (as its idea belonging to the middle term) constitute the elements of the sensuous world according to the original numerical relations. This is the basis from which he proceeds. I will, however, omit his derivation of the figures of the elements, and the combinations of the triangle.

From this, Plato passes on to Physics and Physiology, and we have little desire to follow him into these fields. It is to be looked upon as a first, childish attempt to comprehend the sensuous phenomenon in its multiplicity; but it is still superficial and confused—a method of seizing the sensuous phenomenon, e.g. the limbs and members of the body, and a description of the same in which there are thoughts intermingled; in fact, it reminds one of the formal explanations current in our time, in which all trace of the logical Idea vanishes. It is our interest to hold fast to the logical Idea; to it belongs what is excellent in Plato's treatment. But the realization of the Idea is not attained—Plato has felt and expressed only the need of this. The speculative thought is often discernible here and there, but for the most part the treatment deals with quite external forms, such as conformity to end, &c. We treat Physics in quite another way; with Plato there is a great lack of empirical information, while in modern Physics there is an equal lack of the knowledge of the Idea. Although he discovers a great want of conformity to our system of Physics—a system which does not hold

fast the idea of vitality; and although he discourses in a childish manner, using external analogies, yet he presents us very deep glances into individual departments, glances well worthy of our consideration if our physicists were in the habit of looking at nature from the point of view of vitality. Equally worthy of our attention would seem his account of the relation of the Physiological to the Psychical. Some portions of his exposition contain what is universally valid, e. g. his treatment of colors. From this he branches off again into general considerations. When Plato comes to speak of this subject, he says with reference to the difficulty of distinguishing and knowing the individual, that in the consideration of nature "two causes are to be distinguished, the *necessary* and the *divine*; the divine must be sought in everything in order to attain a blessed life." (This occupation is end and aim in-and-for-itself, and in it lies blessedness) "so far as our nature is susceptible of it: the necessary causes are to be sought only in those things that we cannot know without them" (i. e. as conditions of knowledge). The consideration of necessary causes is an external one touching the connection, relation, &c., of objects. "Of the divine causes, God himself is the author"; the divine appertains to that first "eternal" world not as a "Beyond" but as a "Present." "The production and regulation of mortal things God committed to his assistants." This is an easy mode of transition from the divine to the finite, the earthly. "These now imitating the divine, for the reason that they received into themselves the soul as an immortal principle made a mortal body, and in it placed a mortal idea of the soul. This mortal idea contains the violent and necessary passions: pleasure, the greatest lure to evil; secondly, pain, the hindrance of the good; besides also rashness and fear (the unreasonable counsellor); anger, hope, &c. These affections all belong to the mortal soul, and in order that this shall not pollute the divine where it is not unavoidably necessary the subordinate gods separated this mortal part from the seat of the divine, making it dwell in a different part of the body, and formed an isthmus and separation between the head and the breast, placing the neck between." The feelings, passions, &c., dwell in the breast, in the heart. (The moderns place the immortal soul

in the heart;) the spiritual is in the head, but in order to make it as perfect as possible they, e. g., “inflamed the heart with anger, but placed near it, as a compensation, the lungs, soft and bloodless, pierced with many tubes like a sponge, in order that by taking in air and fluids they may cool off the heart and bring relief to its heat.”

Especially remarkable is that passage concerning the liver: “Since the irrational part of the soul possesses the appetite for eating and drinking, and does not obey reason, God created the liver so that the multitude of thoughts falling on it from the intellect, as upon a mirror that receives and presents images to view, may terrify it; then when this part of the soul is again quieted, it becomes in sleep a participant of visions; for, mindful of the eternal decree to make the race of mortals as good as possible, they have formed even the inferior part of us in some degree cognizant of truth by establishing within it the faculty of divination.” Plato thus ascribes prophecy to the irrational, corporeal side of man; and although the belief prevails that revelation, &c., is ascribed by him to reason, it is nevertheless a mistake. He holds it to be a species of reason appertaining to the irrational. “That God gave prophecy to the irrational part of man, is a striking proof that no man powerful in his reason is participant in a true and divine prophecy, except when in sleep his power of wakeful discernment is fettered, or when by sickness or enthusiasm he is beside himself.” Clairvoyance is thus explained by Plato as something inferior to conscious reason. “The man in his senses, however, has to analyze and interpret such revelations, for he who is still in the trance cannot discern their purport. Hence it was well said by the ancients: ‘to act and to recognize one’s own and himself belongs only to the man in his senses.’” Plato is sometimes appealed to as the authority for mere enthusiasm, but this passage shows the error of such a view. This closes our consideration of Plato’s Philosophy of Nature.

IV.—PHILOSOPHY OF SPIRIT.

We have to some extent on the theoretical side already called attention to the speculative essence of mind, which is, however, still without its realization [in Plato]; and we have

pointed out the very important distinctions which he makes between the different species of knowing. But, after all, we find in Plato as yet no complete consciousness concerning the organism of the theoretical mind, although feeling, memory, &c., are discriminated from Reason; but these moments are neither distinguished with sufficient exactness, nor treated of in the connection in which they stand through necessary relation. Therefore, the only portion of this that will prove interesting in his doctrine of the Mind is his idea concerning the ethical nature of man; and this real, *practical* side of consciousness is preeminently the brilliant one in Plato's treatment, and it lies now before us. Plato, in this investigation, is not trying to find a "supreme moral principle," as it is called, and in which one has only an empty word while he believes that he has everything; nor is it a search for a natural principle of Right—that trivial abstraction from the real, practical essence, the RIGHT; but he unfolds his idea of that "ethical nature" in his books on the Republic. The ethical nature of man seems to us [moderns] to be an entirely different thing from the state; Plato, however, found the reality of spirit—i. e. of Spirit [or Mind] in so far as it is opposed to Nature—in its highest truth and perfection in the State-organization, which as such is essentially ethical; and he recognized the truth that the ethical nature of man (the free will in its rationality) finds its legal rights, its actuality, only in a true nation [or state].

Moreover, it is to be remarked that Plato, in the books of the Republic, introduces the treatment of his subject by showing what justice consists in. After much discursive talk, and many negative considerations with regard to its definitions, Plato finally says in his simple style: "This investigation should be made in the same manner as if one were to have given him the task of reading small print at a great distance; then if he discovers this same type nearer at hand and larger, he would first read the latter, and then he could proceed more easily with the smaller. In such a manner he would now deal with the subject of Justice. Justice is to be found not only in the individual but also in the state, and in the latter to a greater degree than in the former; hence it can be traced in broader characters and be more

easily recognized in the state." (This is different from the Stoical doctrine of "The Wise Man.") "He will on this account prefer to consider, first, what Justice is as it exists in the state." Plato in this manner, through the comparison of these modes of inquiring into the nature of Justice, passes to the consideration of the State; it is a very naive, agreeable transition, and seemingly arbitrary. The great [good] sense of the ancients, however, led them to the True: and what Plato gives here merely as a piece of pleasantry, is in fact rather the nature of the thing itself. It is, therefore, not a mere matter of convenience that conducts him to this theme; but it is the fact that the consummation of Justice is only possible in so far as man is a member of a state; for Justice, in its reality and truth, is to be found only in the state. Right as SPIRIT, not in its phase as Cognition, but in so far as it [spirit] wishes to give itself reality, is the Existence of freedom, the actuality of self-consciousness, the spiritual Being-in-itself and by-itself [independence] which is active: as in property, for example, I posit my freedom in some external thing. The essence of the State is, moreover, the objective actuality of Right: the reality in which exists Spirit as a totality, and not merely my subjective knowing as a particular individual. For when the free rational will determines itself, there arise laws of freedom; but these laws exist likewise as laws of states, since it is precisely the ideal purpose of the state that the rational will shall exist. In the state, therefore, those laws gain validity and become habit and ethical custom; since, however, arbitrariness and caprice likewise prevail, law is not mere ethical custom, but must at the same time be a power against caprice, just as it appears, and hence arise courts of justice and governments. Hence it happens that Plato, in order to recognize the lineaments of Justice, turns with the instinct of reason to the STATE for an exhibition of it.

The Just in itself is commonly conceived by us in the form of natural rights, of Right in a "state of nature"; such a "state of nature" is however an ethical impossibility. Whatever is in-itself [potential], is held by those who do not grasp the universal to be something "natural," just as the necessary moments of spirit are called "*innate ideas*." The natu-

ral is rather that which spirit must negate or annul, and the right of natural condition can make its appearance only as the absolute wrong of spirit. Against the state as spirit in its reality, spirit in its simple ideality not yet realized, is abstract Potentiality; this ideality [*Begriff*] must, of course, precede the construction of its reality, and it is this which has been apprehended as "natural condition." We are accustomed to set out in our theories from the fiction of a *natural condition*, which of course is no condition of spirit, of the rational will, but rather that which exists among animals; for this reason even Hobbes has correctly remarked that the true state of nature is a state of war of all against all. This "in-itself" [potentiality] of spirit is the individual man [taken in his isolation]; for sensuous conception [*Vorstellung*] takes the universal as existing separate from the individual—as though the individual were in-and-for-himself in his exclusiveness, and the universal did not constitute his essential truth: according to this, the universal would not be his essence, but the most important would be what he possessed in himself as a specialty. The fiction of the "state of nature" begins with the individuality of the person, his free will and the relation of this free will to other persons. What should be right by nature has also been considered to be that which is right in the individual and for the individual; and society and the state have been held to be means existing for the individual person who forms the ultimate purpose of their existence. Plato, in opposition to these views, lays down the Universal, the Substantial, as the basis, and, in accordance with this, holds that the individual as such has this Universal for his end and aim, and that the individual subject exercises volition for the state—acts, lives, and enjoys, for it—so that the state becomes his second nature, his ethical custom and habit. This ethical substance, which constitutes the spirit, life and the essence of individuality, and is the basis thereof, systematizes itself to a vital organic whole, inasmuch as it separates itself essentially into members whose activity is no other than the production of the whole.

This relation of the idea [the ideal whole] to its reality had not yet come to consciousness in Plato; and hence we find

with him no philosophical construction that exhibits first the idea in-and-for-itself, and then the necessity of its realization, and then this itself. As regards the Platonic Republic, it has become an established conclusion that Plato has given therein a so-called "*ideal*" of a constitution; this view has become trite in pretty much the following shape: that this notion of an "ideal state" is a chimera, which though it can be thought in one's head just as Plato has described it, and is in itself excellent and true, and that it is also practical, but only under the condition that men are excellent, as they perhaps are in the moon; but that it is not practicable for men just now as they are here on the earth. Since one is obliged to take men as he finds them, he therefore cannot bring this ideal into existence on account of their (men's) depravity; and hence it would be very idle to set up such an ideal.

As to the first point, it is to be remarked that in the Christian world an ideal of a perfect man is current, though indeed it cannot exist as the mass of a people. If we find it realized in monks or Quakers, or the like pious people, yet a crowd of such sorrowful creatures could form no real nation, as little as lice or parasitical plants could exist for themselves and not upon an organized body. If such men should constitute a nation, this lamb-like soft disposition, this vanity which busies itself with the particular person, providing shelter and sustenance for it, and always assumes the image and consciousness of peculiar excellence, would go to destruction. For the life in the universal and for the universal does not require that lame and cowardly mildness, but rather an energetic one; not an occupation with itself and its sins, but with the universal and that which has to do with it. Now if that spurious ideal hovers before one, he, of course, finds mankind always affected with weakness and depravity, and that ideal not realized; for it sets a value upon trifles that no rational man sees, and it takes for granted that such weakness and errors are there even though they are not visible. But this is not to be considered as greatness of mind on their part; we must rather attribute what they call weakness and error to the fact that they see things through their own corruption. The man who has weakness and error is immediately absolved from it through himself in so far as he makes

nothing out of it [i. e. does not make it his function]. Vice is vice only if it is essential to the individual, and depravity consists in this: to hold it for somewhat essential. The mentioned ideal must, therefore, not stand in our way whatever be its form, even if it is not exactly that of the monks or Quakers: for instance, as this principle of the inadequacy of sensuous things and the deficiency of energy in performance that must let much fail which deserves success. To preserve all relations is contradictory; there is always a side in them that gives offence though they are otherwise right and proper. Moreover, what has been said in another place concerning the relation of Philosophy to the state, has shown that the Platonic ideal is not to be taken in this sense. If an ideal as such has truth through its conformity to the concrete idea, then it is no chimera precisely because it is true; for the truth is no chimera: such an ideal is, therefore, nothing idle and powerless, but rather the Actual. To indulge in wishes is a quite innocent occupation; if, however, one gets no further than pious wishes for the realization of what is great and true, he is godless: and the man who can do nothing [change nothing] because all is holy and inviolable [as it is], and will not be anything determinate [i. e. will not take up any specialty] for the reason that all determined things have their deficiency. The TRUE IDEAL is not something that merely *ought* to be actual, but it IS actual, and is *alone* the Actual; if an idea were too good for existence, then the defect would be in the idea itself, and actuality would likewise be too good for it. The Platonic Republic would be a chimera, not for the reason that humanity lacked excellence, but that its excellence was of too inferior a quality for humanity. FOR THAT WHICH IS ACTUAL IS REASONABLE. But one must know what is *in fact* actual [i. e. know the difference between Seeming and True Being]; in common life everything is regarded as actual; but there is a distinction to be made between the phenomenal world and that of actuality. The actual has also an external finite side which exhibits caprice and contingency, as happens in nature when a tree, a house, and a plant come together [i. e. a connection exists between things not essentially connected]. The surface of the Ethical—the deeds of men—has much that is bad, and much that could be

done better; men will always be vicious and depraved, but this is not the IDEA. If one would recognize the actuality of substance he must look through the surface on which the passions contend for mastery. The temporal, the perishable, exists, it is true, and it can make needs and wants enough for any one; but nevertheless it is no true actuality, no more than is the particularity of the subject, his wishes and inclinations. In this connection we must refer again to the distinction made in speaking of the Platonic nature of philosophy: The eternal world, as the in-himself blessed God, is the actuality; not a "*beyond*" the "other side," but the present world *considered in its truth*, not as it appears to the ear and eye, &c., *sensuously*. If we consider the content of the Platonic Idea, we shall see that Plato has portrayed in the Republic the Greek ethical culture in its substantial form; the Greek national life is what constitutes the true content of this work. Plato is not the man to busy himself with abstract theories and principles; his true spirit has recognized and unfolded the True: and this could be nothing else than the True in the world in which he lived, this one spirit which was vital in him as well as in Greece. No one can transcend his time; the spirit of his time is also his spirit; but he must see to it that he does not fail to recognize it according to its content.

In the second place, a perfect constitution must be made with special reference to a given people, for no constitution is adapted to all nations. Thus if it be said that a true constitution is not adapted to men as they are, it is to be replied that the constitution of a nation is the more excellent, the more excellent it renders the nation; but then, on the other hand, since the ethics of the people constitutes the real living constitution, the constitution in its abstraction is really nothing taken for and by itself, but must be related to the former, and the living spirit of the people must fill it. Therefore, it cannot be said that there is one true constitution which is adapted for each and every nation; and it is, of course, the actual fact that for men as they are, e. g. the Iroquois, the Russians, the French, no one constitution is good for all; for the nation belongs to History. But in the same manner that the individual man is educated in the state, i. e. is ele-

vated from individuality into universality, and from a child becomes a man, so is each nation educated; it passes from its condition of childhood, or its barbaric state, over into a rational condition. Men do not merely stand still as they are, they become something else; and so it is with their constitutions. And it is here the question, "What is that true form which the nation must move towards?" just as it is the question, "What is the true science of mathematics, or any other subject?" but not whether children or boys are to possess this science; they must first be educated up to the capacity of acquiring it. Hence the true constitution stands before the Historical people as a form that the latter gradually approach. Every people must in the course of time make such changes in its existing constitution as will bring it nearer and nearer to the true one. Its spirit issues forth from the leading-strings of childhood; and the constitution is the nation's consciousness concerning that which it is in itself the form of its truth and of the knowledge of itself. If its internal being is no longer what its constitution expresses as the True—if its consciousness or its ideal being and its reality are different,—then the national spirit is a sundered, divided existence. There are two cases of this kind: first, the nation may through an internal, more powerful eruption strike down the existing form of lawful order; or it may change the existing law (which has lost its ethical hold on the people) quietly and slowly, and substitute for it the law which is more in accordance with its true ethical status. Secondly, it may not have the intelligence and strength for this change, and for that reason remain standing under the sway of the inferior laws belonging to the ethical condition outgrown; or it may be that another people which has already reached the higher status, and is for this reason more perfect, subdues the former nation, and it loses its separate existence. On this account it is of essential importance to know what the true constitution is; for what opposes it has no abiding validity, no truth, and is self-destructive. It may have a temporal existence, but it cannot preserve it; it may have possessed validity, but it can no longer continue to do so. That it must be abolished, lies in the idea of its constitution. This insight [into the development of national idea as em-

bodied in a constitution] can be attained only through philosophy [i. e. through an investigation of historical data in the light of the pure IDEA]. National changes happen without violent revolutions if the insight [reached by the thinkers of the nation] has become universal [i.e. it has penetrated the masses]; regulations fall away and are lost, one knows not how, and each citizen submits in this to his loss of rights. Whether the time is ripe for this change or not is a matter that the governing power should know; if it adopts mere temporal regulations, not conscious of what is in truth the need of the time—if it takes under its protection the Unessential and gives it validity as against the Essential (and what this Essential is, is contained in and determined by the national Idea),—then it itself gets overthrown before the growing national spirit, and the dissolution of the government is followed by that of the nation itself; or else, on the other hand, the government and the Unessential retain the upper hand.

The chief thought that lies at the basis of Plato's Republic is precisely that which is to be viewed as the principle of Greek Ethics; that, namely, the Ethical is the Substantial as related to the other elements, and hence is to be held fast as the Divine. This is, of course, the fundamental principle. That which conflicts with this substantial relation of the individual to the ethical status is the subjective arbitrary will of the individual, the *moral* standpoint, to wit: that the individual does not act from respect or reverence for the institutions of the state or of the country, but from *his own conviction*, adopting his resolutions upon moral considerations, and determining himself accordingly. This principle of subjective freedom is a later one, and is the principle of the culture of modern times, and it appears in the Greek world as the principle of destruction to the Greek state-life. It was its destruction for the reason that the Greek spirit had not adapted and could not adapt its laws and constitution to this principle grown up in it. Since the two were not homogeneous, the Grecian ethical and conventional status must perish. Plato recognized and comprehended the true spirit of his world, and set out with the definite intention of making this new principle impossible in his Republic. Plato has, therefore, placed himself upon a substantial standpoint, for

the substantial element of his time lies at the basis of it; but it is only relatively so, since it is only a Greek standpoint, and the latter principle is intentionally proscribed. This is the general element of the Platonic ideal of the State, and from this point of view it must be considered; investigations into the question whether such a state is possible or the best one, questions discussed in the light of modern standpoints, lead only to shallow views. In modern states freedom of conscience exists, and through that freedom each individual can demand the privilege of caring for his own interests; this, however, is all excluded from the Platonic Idea.

a. *Plato's Idea of a State.*

I will now bring up in a more definite manner the chief points in so far as they have philosophic interest. Though Plato presents the state as it is in truth, yet the Platonic state has a defect which we shall learn: that, namely, the individual does not, in formal rights, stand in opposition to this general element as he does in the dead constitutions of the States founded on a legal basis. The content is only the total; though this is the *nature* of the individual, yet it is that only as reflecting itself into the universal, and not as unyielding, or as something possessing value in and for itself; so that the practical essence of the state and individual are the same. Hence while Plato sets out with the idea of Justice that takes for granted that only just individuals exist as ethical members of the state, yet he undertakes to show in the course of the treatment how this actuality of the substantial spirit is realized; i.e. in the first place, the organism of the ethical community as it exists in the distinctions or differences which lie in the idea of the ethical substance [the articulation into castes, or the division of labor]. Through the unfolding of these moments [or distinctions] they become vital and existent; these moments, however, are not independent, but exist only in a unity. Plato considers these moments of the ethical organism in three shapes: first, as they exist as conditions or employments in the state; secondly, as duties or moments of the ethical; thirdly, as moments of the individual subject—of the empirical actuality of the will. Plato

preaches not *morality* but *Ethics*; he shows how the Ethical is a vital self-movement, and he exhibits its functions as it were its viscera; for inward systematic movement as found in the organic body, in contradistinction to the solid, dead unity of metallic bodies, arises only from distinct visceral functions which are essential to a vital self-moving unity.

a. Without ranks and stations [differences of vocation], without this division into great masses, the state has no organism; these great distinctions are grounded in the Substantial. The first antithesis which we meet with in the state is that of the *universal* (as occupation in the business of the state, and life devoted to the state) and the *individual* (as life and labor for the individual self); the two Employments are so divided that one station is assigned to this person and the other to that person. More in detail, Plato makes three systems of actuality belonging to the Ethical: (1) the functions of legislation — the activity and provision for the Universal, for the interest of the whole as such; (2) the defence of the commonwealth against enemies from without; (3) provision for the individual, for his wants, through agriculture, grazing, production of clothing, houses, utensils, &c. This treatment is in general quite correct, yet it seems too much as if derived from an external necessity, because such “wants” are taken for granted without being deduced from the idea [or Essential Nature] of spirit. These different functions are next distributed into various systems, being shared each by a mass of individuals who are specially fitted thereto; and thus arise the different ranks and stations in the state; for Plato is also opposed to that superficial notion that all people must be one and the same [in respect to rank and station; i. e. abstract equality is not Plato's idea]. He accordingly makes three ranks: (1) that of the rulers, learned men, scholars; (2) that of the military; (3) of those who provide the necessities of life — agriculturists and mechanics. The first he also calls the state guardians (*phulakas*), the essentially philosophically cultured statesmen, who possess true science; they have the military to assist them, but in such a form that the military and civil ranks do not exclude each other but are conjoined, and the oldest ones are to be the state guar-

dians.* Although Plato has not deduced this division of ranks, yet in this manner is formed the constitution of the Platonic state; and every state is necessarily a system containing these systems within itself. Plato proceeds from this point to individual determinations which are in part trivial and are better dispensed with: e. g. he defines special titularies for the first rank, and discourses on such subjects as show how the nurses should demean themselves, &c. (Rep. Bk. V.)

b. In the next place, Plato shows the moments which are here realized in the several ranks and orders as ethical properties which are present in the individual and constitute his essence: the simple ethical IDEA divided into its general determinatenesses. For as result of this division into ranks and orders, he proves that through such an organism all virtues may be vitally present in the commonwealth; he distinguishes four of these, and they have been called *the cardinal virtues*.

(1) As the first virtue appear WISDOM (*sophia*) and science: such a state will be wisely and well governed—not for the reason that there are many arts known there by the multitude which relate to special employments—as smithing, agriculture (sciences relating to industry and wealth we should call them); but on account of TRUE SCIENCE, which has its reality in the existence of the rank or order of overseer and regent, which deliberates concerning the general interest, as well what is best for it in itself as in its relation to other states. This insight is properly the possession of the few only. (Rep. Bk. IV.)

(2) The second virtue is BRAVERY [“fortitude” or moral courage] (*andria*), which Plato defines as the firm assertion of what is just, and a preservation of the opinion which the laws have founded, that there are certain things to be dreaded, and bravery [fortitude], steadfast in spirit, does not yield to these though impelled by appetite or lured by pleasure.

* Note by German Editors.—“In accordance with these Notes on Plato, Hegel united these two vocations, in an early Essay on the Philosophy of Rights (Works, 2d ed., vol. I. p. 330–1), which he at a later period (vol. VIII. p. 267) called the General Order (rank or class) of citizens; the “other” rank (as Hegel expresses himself in the first passage) mentioned by Plato, Hegel divided into two, in both expositions; the second (trades) and third (agriculture).”

This virtue belongs to the vocation of the warrior. (Rep. Bk. IV.)

(3) The third virtue is **TEMPERANCE** (*sophrosune*), the power to control appetites and passions, which preserves the whole as a harmony; so that the weaker and the stronger—whether in mind or body, in numbers or wealth, or in whatever respect—work together for one common result and are harmonious. This virtue is, therefore, not (like wisdom and bravery) limited to parts of the state, but is prescribed for both rulers and ruled as a harmony, a virtue for all ranks. (Rep. Bk. IV.) Notwithstanding this virtue of temperance is the harmony in which all work towards a common end, yet it is peculiarly the virtue of the third class, to whom belongs the labor of supplying bodily wants and necessities, though at first glance it would not seem thus. But this virtue consists precisely in preventing any moment, determinateness, or individuality, from isolating itself; in its more limited moral signification it takes care that no want or necessity is allowed to become essential and thereby become a vice. Labor [industry] is the moment of human activity, which is limited to the individual, but returns to the Universal and is for it [i. e. since the individual through his industry elaborates products which supply the wants of *all*, and thereby *relieve* all from the tyranny of those wants, Hegel says that industry is the phase of human activity through which a return is made or begun from the extreme depth of specialization. The individual enslaves himself to emancipate himself; for each works for all, and therefore all for each]. Hence though this virtue is common to all classes, yet it pertains specially to the third class to bring it into harmony, for it lacks the absolute harmony which the other conditions have in themselves.

(3) The fourth virtue, finally, is **JUSTICE**, and this is treated of from the beginning to the end. This is found in the state (as integrity) in this: that each individual busies himself only about such concerns as relate to the state, and for which his nature has best adapted him; so that each one does not pursue a variety of vocations, but confines himself to that for which he is fitted: young and old, boys, women, freemen, slaves, mechanics, rulers and ruled. We must remark concerning this, in the first place, that Plato places Justice here

side by side with the other moments, and it appears as one of the four determinations. But he withdraws from this position so far as to make Justice that which first gives to the others—Temperance, Bravery, and Wisdom—the power to become, and, when they exist, to preserve them. On this account, he says that Justice will also be found where those other virtues are found. (Rep. Bk. IV.) This means, when explained, that the IDEA of Justice is the basis, the idea of the Totality that is thus divided organically, and that each part is in the Totality only as moment, and the Totality is only through each part; so that in this virtue those [social] classes or properties [of the individual] are only moments. Justice alone is this universal, all-pervading substance: but it is at the same time the for-itself-being [independence] of each part which the state permits to exist for and by itself.

It is evident therefore, in the second place, that Plato has understood by the term Justice, not the right of property—as is commonly done in sciences of Right—but this: that Justice is the Spirit attaining in its totality to its rights as the real existence of its freedom. In property my personality exists very abstractly, my abstract freedom. Plato holds particular treatment of the duties of this science of Rights to be on the whole superfluous. (Rep. Bk. IV.) We find, it is true, laws concerning property, policy, &c.; “But,” says he, “to enounce laws on this subject to noble and beautiful men is not worth the pains.” Really, how will one be able to discover divine laws for that whose material contains only contingency? Also, in the books on “The Laws,” Plato considers chiefly the ethical phase; yet he goes somewhat more at length into the former [i. e. civil rights]. Since however Justice, according to Plato, is the entire essence, which is so related to the individual that through it each one may accomplish in the best manner that for which he was born; therefore the individual comes to his rights only in the form of definite [special] individuality: only in this way does he belong to the universal spirit of the state, and in it attain his Universal as a particular person. While the right is the Universal with a definite [limited] content, and consequently is only *formal* universality; yet this content is the definite *total* individuality, not this or that thing belonging to me through

accidental possession; but my *real* ownership consists in the developed possession and use of my nature. Justice allows in general each special trait of character to have its rights, and thus leads it back into the whole; through this, that the particularity of an individual must be developed and come to existence, each one occupies his place and fulfils his vocation. Justice, therefore, means—according to its true idea as we seize it—freedom, in the subjective sense; and this because it is that which obtains rational existence; and since this right—that freedom shall become existent—is universal, Plato places Justice above all as the vocation of the whole in the sense that rational freedom obtains existence through the organism of the state—an existence which becomes through its inherent necessity a form of nature.

c. The individual subject [or Ego], as subject, has likewise these properties belonging to him; and these moments of the subject correspond to the three real moments of the state. That in this way there is a rhythm in the idea of the state—is the great and beautiful basis of the Platonic State. This third form, in which those moments appear, Plato describes as follows: There are shown in the subject, in the first place, *wants*, appetites like hunger and thirst, each of which relates to something definite and to this only. The labor for the [gratification of] the appetite corresponds to the vocation of the third rank [or class]. At the same time, however, there is found, secondly, in the individual consciousness something else which restrains and hinders the gratification of this appetite, and holds control over its incitement; this is the Rational (*logos*). To this corresponds the position of guardian, the wisdom of the state. Besides these two ideas of the soul, there is a third, *Anger* (*thumos*), which is in part akin to appetite, but likewise also contends against appetite and assists Reason. “When one has done an unjust deed and it causes him to undergo hunger and cold, which he believes he suffers justly; then the nobler he is, the less anger he will feel against the inflicter: on the other hand, when he suffers injustice, it ferments and boils within him, and he allies himself to that side which is just, and endures and vanquishes hunger and frost and other miseries which are inimical to his appetites, till he carries his point or dies, or is pacified through

reasons just as a dog is called off and pacified by the shepherd." Anger corresponds to the vocation of the brave defender of the state: just as he takes up his weapons in behalf of the reason of the state, so Anger when it is not corrupted through bad education stands by Reason. Just as the wisdom of the state is the same as that of the individual, so also is the bravery; and so in the case of the rest, temperance, and harmony of the individual moments of the Natural: and justice, as it is in external acts where each works out his own part, so too in the Internal each moment of spirit obtains its rights, and mingles not in the business of the others, but allows them freedom. (Rep. Bk. IV.) We have thus a syllogism of three moments, in which the middle term between universality and individuality is anger; it is the for-itself-existing [independent] moment, and is directed against the objective, constitutes the middle term as freedom returning into itself, and conducting itself negatively in relation to itself. This is always present to Plato—this internal truth—even when he has no consciousness of its abstract idea—as in the *Timæus*, for example; and everything [in Plato's works] develops from it. This is the manner in which Plato makes disposition for the whole; the carrying out is a matter of details which has no further interest here.

b. *The Means of Preserving a State.*

Then, secondly, Plato gives the means of preserving the state. Since now the whole community rests upon Ethics as the spirit which has become [by use and habit] the [second] nature of individuals, the question arises: how does he manage to give to each the business which is his vocation so that it becomes his peculiar being and exists as the ethical act and desire of the individual,—so that each with temperance shall subordinate himself to his [proper] rank and position? The chief point is to EDUCATE the individual for this. Plato desires to produce this ethical result directly on the individual, first and chiefly in the guardians, whose culture is the most important part of the whole and constitutes the foundation. For since to the guardians is left the care of producing this ethical status through the preservation of the laws, it is necessary [in the laws] to have special regard paid to their

education; so also to that of the warriors. How it is in the trades, the state cares not so much; "for if the cobbler is wretched and corrupt, and only seems to be what he should be, that is no misfortune to the state." (Rep. Bk. IV.) The culture of the guardian should, however, be perfected through science and philosophy, which is the knowledge of the Universal—of the existent in-and-for-itself. Plato mentions as the means of culture: Religion, Art, Science. In detail, he describes how far music and gymnastics should be admitted as means. But the poets Homer and Hesiod he banishes from his state, because he finds their representations of God unworthy. (Rep. Bks. II., III., V., VII.) For in that time it began to become an earnest business with the consideration of the faith in Jupiter and the Homeric histories, since such individual narrations were taken as universal maxims and divine laws. In a certain stage of culture childish stories are innocent; if, however, they should be set up as the basis of the truth of ethics as law for the present time (as, for example, in the Scriptures of the Israelites—the Old Testament—the extirpation of nations has been used as a rule in the rights of nations; and the innumerable turpitudes which David, the man of God, committed, and the cruelties of the priesthood through Samuel against Saul, have been used as justifications of the like in our time), then the time has come to reduce them to something merely historical, a thing of the past. Plato, besides this, desires to prepare introductions to the laws, in which citizens are exhorted to their duties, and convinced of the importance of the choice of the most excellent, &c.—in short, of ethical culture.

Here, however, there is a circle: the public state-life is founded on ethics, and conversely ethics is founded on the institutions of the state. Ethics must not be independent of institutions: i. e. institutions must not be founded simply on ethics through forms of education as, e. g., Religion. Moreover, institutions must be regarded as the first condition for the existence of ethics and as presupposed by it, for this [ethics] is the form in which institutions have their subjective side. Plato himself gives us to understand how much contradiction he expected to find. And yet it is the custom to blame him for being too idealistic; but the defect lies rather in the fact that

he is not idealistic enough. For though Reason is set up as the universal [all-prevailing] power, this [power] is essentially spiritual; but subjective freedom belongs to the spiritual—and this is the very thing that Socrates had set up as his principle. While the Rational should be the basis of law, and *is* on the whole, yet, on the other hand, conscience—one's own conviction—(all forms of subjective freedom) are essentially contained therein. At first this subjectivity stands opposed to the laws—which form the rational groundwork of the state-organism—and which are the absolute power whose function is to assimilate the individual member of the family [i.e. digest him] through an external system of wants, in which Reason, however, exists as the essential object. It begins with the subjectivity of the free arbitrary will, joins itself to the whole, chooses a vocation, and raises itself to the rank of an ethical being. But this moment [or element] in general, this movement of the individual, this principle of subjective freedom, partly escapes Plato's attention, and in part is intentionally neglected because it proved by its fruits to be the principle that wrought the ruin of Greece; and his sole aim is to discover how the organization of the state should be best secured, and not how subjective individuality is to be attained. Instead of transcending the principle of Greek ethical culture, which was not able to permit the growth and development of subjective freedom within its substantial freedom, the Platonic philosophy seized that principle [of ethical culture] and unfolded it.

c. *The Exclusion of Subjective Freedom.*

As regards this aim—to exclude the principle of subjective freedom—it is one of the chief objects sought in the Platonic Republic. The spirit of it consists essentially in this, that all sides in which the individuality as such is fixed, are to be dissolved in the Universal—all individuals shall attain recognition only as *universal* men.

a. This purpose to exclude the principle of subjectivity renders it extremely proper that Plato should deny to the individual the privilege of choosing his vocation; a privilege which we consider to be necessary for freedom. It is, however, not birth which separates the ranks, and destines the

individual for his vocation; each one is examined by the regents of the state (the elders of the first rank, to whom is assigned the function of educating the rest), and according to natural fitness and capacity displayed, the choice of occupation is made and the individual assigned a definite sphere by those regents. This would seem, according to our modern principles, thoroughly contradictory. For although it is obvious that there is a special capacity and fitness desirable in every vocation, yet individual inclination should not be ignored in determining what sphere of activity a man shall fill; and this inclination, as a seeming free choice, is necessary to make his vocation truly his own. It is not for one man to prescribe for another individual, and say, e. g.: "Since you are good for nothing better, you shall become a cobbler." Each may attempt for himself; he must be allowed to decide for himself in a subjective manner since he is a subject, and he may settle his course through his own caprice without regard to external circumstances; and no one shall say "nay" to him if, e. g., he says, "I will apply myself to study."

b. Furthermore, it follows from this purpose in view [the subjective in subjective caprice], that Plato (Rep. Bk. III.) in his State has also done away with the principle of private property. For in that [private property] individuality, the individual consciousness, becomes absolute; in other words, the person [as property-owner] is viewed as independent without content in any form. In Rights as such, I am a particular individual in and for myself. All are such, and I am thus only because all are; i. e. I am a universal [or the whole finds its realization in each]; but the content of this universality is fixed individuality. Whenever in Rights the question is concerning what justice is as such, the judges do not lay stress on whether this or that man possesses this house, nor do the parties lay stress on the possession of this particular thing about which they are contending, but they contend for justice for its own sake (as morality lays stress on duty for its own sake); and thus this abstraction is held fast and separated from the content of reality. But the essence is not held by Philosophy to be an abstraction, but it is found to be the unity of this universal and the reality (or its content). The content, therefore, is retained only in so far as it is posited

negatively in the universal [i. e. only as food for the action of the universal]: therefore only as returning—not in and for itself [as having independent validity]. In so far as I *use* things—not in so far as I merely *possess* them as property, not in so far as they are to me fixed things existing for me, who am also a fixed somewhat—do they stand in living relation to me. Plato makes the other ranks, the laborers, tradesmen, agriculturists, produce the necessities of life for all, without acquiring property for themselves through their labor; but the whole is only one family in which each one has his prescribed business, the product of the labor being common to all, and the producer too, like the rest, uses from the common store whatever he needs. Property is a possession which belongs to me as this particular person, and it (my person as such) comes to existence, to reality; on this ground Plato excludes it. It remains an unsolved question, however, how there can be found in the development of the trades, where the hope of private property is lacking, a stimulant to activity, for the fact that I am an active person depends chiefly on my ability to acquire property thereby. That by such an arrangement as Plato supposes (Rep. Bk. V.) all strife, dissensions, hatred, avarice, &c., are to be prevented, can indeed be imagined; but all this would be only a subordinate result in comparison to the higher and more rational principle of the right of property: and freedom has external existence only in so far as the person comes to possession of property. This is the form in which we see subjective freedom intentionally banished by Plato from his state.

c. On the same ground, Plato does away with marriage, because it is a bond in which a person of one sex belongs to a person of the other sex reciprocally and permanently—a bond outside of the merely natural relation. Plato does not allow the family life to arise in his state—possessing as it does an exclusiveness peculiar to itself, and by which it [the family] constitutes a whole for itself—because it [the family] is only an extended personality; i. e. a relation, set up within the natural ethical culture, that excludes others, and, though the family principle is an ethical one, it is however such a one as pertains to the individual as a special individuality. According to the idea of subjective freedom, the family is

just as necessary—nay, sacred—to the individual, as property is. Plato, on the contrary, has the children taken away from their mothers directly after birth, placed together in an institution for the purpose, and brought up by wet-nurses chosen from the mothers, and educated in common: and this is carried out in such a manner that no mother shall be able to recognize her child afterward. Though there were to be marriages and each man was to have his own wife, yet the union of men and women was not to presuppose a personal inclination, nor was it to be a special liking which determined individuals for each other. The women were to bear from the twentieth to the fortieth year, the men have wives from the thirtieth to the fifty-fifth year. In order to prevent incest, the children who were born after the marriage of a man were all to be known as his children. (Rep. Bk. V.) Women, whose essential vocation is the family life, are deprived of this their province. In the Platonic republic, therefore, this results: since the family is dissolved and women cannot preside over the home, that they are no longer private persons, and therefore have to assume the vocations of man as the universal individual in the state, and Plato on this account has the women, like the men, share in all masculine employments—nay, even in that of war. Thus he sets them upon nearly the same footing as men, but has no remarkable confidence in their bravery, since he places them only in the rear, although not as a reserve but as an *arrière garde*, in order at least to cause fear in the enemy by numbers, and in case of necessity to render assistance. (Rep. Bk. V.)

These constitute the chief features of the Platonic Republic, which has in it this essential thing, to wit, the suppression of individuality; and it seems that the IDEA makes this demand, and that precisely in this lies the opposition of Philosophy to the method of sensuous representation which regards the individual as the self-existent, and thus it sees in the state as the real spirit, right of property, protection of person and property to be the basis of the whole. In this is found precisely the limit of the Platonic Idea—it only makes its appearance as abstract idea. But, in fact, the true idea is precisely this, that each moment realizes itself perfectly, embodies itself and becomes independent, and yet in its inde-

pendence is annulled [subordinated] for spirit. In accordance with this idea it is necessary that the individuality perfectly realize itself, have its field and realm in the state, and yet be dissolved in it. The element of the state is the family: i. e. the family is the natural, irrational state: this element must as such be extant. Then, too, the Idea of the rational state has to realize the moments of its ideal being so that they become classes of citizens, and the ethical substance is thereby sundered into masses, just as the corporeal substance is divided into viscera and organs, each of which carries on vitality in a special function, and yet all constitute together only one life. The state in general, the total, must pervade each and all. The formal principle of right also—as abstract universality of personality with the undivided as its existing content—must run through all; and yet a particular rank or station belongs to it. Thus, also, there must be a rank or station in which the immediately permanent property, like the possession of the body, is vested as a territorial possession; and then a rank or station in which there is acquired continually not such an immediate possession, but an estate which is ever changing and wavering. These two ranks or stations expose the nation partially to the principle of individuality, and allow here the right to rule; to seek a perpetuity, the universal, the *in itself*, in this principle, which is rather that of movability. This principle must possess its quite perfect reality, and must also exist as property. This is the first appearance of the true real spirit in which each moment preserves its own perfect independence, and at the same time allows its other-being to possess the perfect indifference of being; this, Nature is not adequate to—it cannot exhibit independent life in its parts, except in great systems. This is, as we shall see elsewhere, the great superiority which the modern world has over the ancient—in it the Objective obtains greater, nay, absolute independence, which therefore renders it so much the more difficult to return to the unity of the idea.

The deficiency of subjectivity is the deficiency of the Greek ethical idea itself. The principle which Socrates originated was hitherto extant only in a subordinate form; it must now become also an absolute principle, a necessary moment of the

Idea itself. Through the exclusion of property and of family life, through the cancelling of arbitrary will in the choice of occupation—i. e. the doing away with all determinations which relate to the principle of subjective freedom—Plato believes that he has shut the door against all passions; he had clearly recognized the fact that the destruction of Greek life was immanent when individuals sought to make valid their aims, inclinations and interests as such, and were allowing these to get the mastery over the common spirit. Inasmuch as this principle is rendered necessary by the Christian Religion—in which the soul of the individual is the absolute end and aim, and thus has entered into the world as necessary in the idea of spirit—it is easy to see that the Platonic constitution cannot fulfil the higher demands made upon an ethical organism. Plato did not recognize the knowing, willing, and resolving of the individual and its repose on itself, nor did he know how to unite it with its idea; justice, however, demands likewise for this its rights—that it attain the higher solution and harmony with the universal. The opposite of Plato's principle is the principle of the conscious free will of the individual which in later times has been set up, especially by Rousseau: that the caprice of the individual as individual, the self-expression of the individual is necessary. In that statement, therefore, the principle has gone over into the opposite extreme and appears in its complete one-sidedness. In opposition to this caprice and individual culture, the Universal in-and-for-itself must exist—the thought, not as wise ruler and ethical system, but as *law*, and at the same time as my essence and my thought, i. e. as subjectivity and individuality. Man must produce the rational itself out of his own interests and passions; just as it enters into actuality through the pressure of necessity, opportunity, and occasion.

Æsthetics.

There still remains to be considered briefly a famous side of the Platonic Philosophy, namely, the *Æsthetic*, the science of the Beautiful. Upon this subject, likewise, Plato has seized the only true thought: that the essence of the Beautiful is the intellectual, the idea of Reason. When he speaks of a

spiritual beauty, he is not to be understood as saying, that beauty as sensuous is beauty which is to be thought as in some place one knows not where; but that which is beautiful in the sensuous is spiritual beauty. Just as the essence and the truth of the phenomenal is the idea, so is also the truth of phenomenal beauty likewise the idea. The relation to the corporeal as a relation between appetite, or the Agreeable and the Useful, is no relation to it as beautiful; it is a relation to it as merely sensuous, or a relation of the individual to the individual. The essence of the Beautiful, however, is only the simple idea of Reason existing in a sensuous manner as a thing; the content of this thing is nothing else than the idea. (Plato: Hippias Major.) The beautiful is essentially of a spiritual nature; it is, therefore, not merely a sensuous thing, but the actuality subordinated to the form of universality, of truth. But this universal retains not the *form* of universality although the Universal is its *content*, but its form is the sensuous; and in this, lies the determinateness of the Beautiful. In science, on the other hand, the Universal has also the *form* of the Universal, or of the Idea; the beautiful, however, enters as actual thing,—or in language as representation (the shape that the *thing* takes in the spirit). The nature, essence and content of the Beautiful is alone to be recognized and criticised through the Reason, since it is the same content that philosophy has. Since Reason appears in the Beautiful in the form of a *thing*, the Beautiful remains subordinate to Science; and Plato has on this account placed its [Reason's] true appearance—where it has the form of the spiritual—in scientific knowledge.

Conclusion.

This may be given as the chief content of the Platonic Philosophy: *first*, the accidental form of discourse in which noble free men converse without other interests than that of the spiritual life of Theory; *secondly*, they come, led only by the content, to the deepest ideas and most beautiful thoughts like precious stones which one finds, if not exactly on a desert, yet upon a dry journey; *thirdly*, there is found no systematic connection, though all flows from one common interest; *fourthly*, the subjectivity of the idea is everywhere

lacking; but, *fifthly*, the substantial idea forms the foundation. Plato's Philosophy has two stages on which it must expand and be elaborated into a higher principle. The Universal, which is in the Reason, must *first* be dirempted into the strongest, infinite antithesis, into the independence of personal consciousness which is for itself: therefore, in the New Academy, the self-consciousness returns into itself and becomes a form of scepticism; it is the negative Reason which is turned against all forms of the Universal, and knows not how to find the unity of the self-consciousness and the Universal, and hence remains in the former [i.e. holds by self-consciousness]. *Secondly*, the New Platonists make the return by finding this unity of self-consciousness and the absolute essence: to them God is immediately present in the Reason, which is the rational cognition of the divine spirit, and the content of this cognition is the essence of God. We shall consider these themes hereafter.
